

# THEOLOGY

A Monthly Journal of Historic Christianity

Edited by the DEAN OF WINCHESTER, THE DEANERY, WINCHESTER, to whom  
all editorial matters should be addressed.

---

Vol. XXVI

MARCH, 1933

No. 153

---

## EDITORIAL

WE publish this month a review by the Bishop of Truro of the learned and weighty work, *Liturgy and Worship*, recently published by the S.P.C.K. with the support of the Literature Committee of the English Church Union. Its rapid circulation shows that it meets a real demand, and many parts of it, as the Bishop points out, make a permanent contribution to the literature of the subject. The present writer has reason to know the arduousness of the task which confronts the Editor or Editors of a composite volume: but in this case their task was complicated by the fact that much of the material which the book has to handle does not lend itself to easily readable, flowing expression. Room had to be found for abundance of technical detail; some of the essays, indeed, are necessarily almost wholly technical; and the editors are to be congratulated on the way in which they have managed to combine these technicalities with an interest which rarely flags, and is sometimes absorbing.

Among the most important essays we should be disposed to place Dr. Firminger's on the Ordinal. It appears to us to close the controversy over Anglican orders by making it a minor issue of the Papacy problem, the Roman attitude being determined not by historical or liturgical considerations, but solely by the papal *ipse dixit*. With regard to the *porrectio instrumentorum*, Dr. Firminger writes (pp. 643, 644): "How, we may ask, came it about that in the West the laying on of hands that is to be found in every Catholic rite of Ordination to the sacred Orders came to be regarded as secondary to a ceremony which was not older than the eleventh century? and how could a form of Ordination in which the Holy Spirit is not mentioned be regarded as the essential form in a sacrament in which, as Innocent I. has written, the Holy Spirit is 'especially operative'?" The answer, he says, is to be found in the way in



which the Augustinian divorce between the doctrine of the Sacraments and the doctrine of the Church rooted itself in Latin theology. Dr. Firminger is equally interesting when he comes to consider the degradation of the Episcopate which prevailed in the Middle Ages. The difference of view between the theologians and the canonists over the status of the Episcopate is well known; but few perhaps realized before that a priest had power to ordain to the priesthood, if the Pope licensed him to do so, and this not *in partibus* but in a fully Catholic diocese. In view of Dr. Firminger's evidence showing the virtual Presbyterianism of the Papacy in the Middle Ages, the stand made for Episcopacy by the Church of England in the sixteenth century becomes all the more significant.

Among other essays of great importance are Dr. Harris's on "The Communion of the Sick, Viaticum, and Reservation," and Dr. Lowther Clarke's on "Prayer Book Translations." Dr. Harris collects a most powerful weight of evidence as to the attitude of the chief Reformers to Reservation, and the bearing of Anglican formularies upon it. It is not often realized how the rarity with which the Holy Communion was celebrated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had made Reservation impossible, and that the alternative provision contained in the office for the Communion of the Sick was therefore an urgent necessity. Dr. Lowther Clarke's essay on "Prayer Book Translations" is, so far as we know, the only work on the subject; and it has special importance today in view of the world-wide responsibilities of Anglicanism. No one could have more appropriately written it than the Editorial Secretary of the S.P.C.K.



## HISTORY AND BELIEF IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

To investigate and seek to understand the development of belief apart from its historical setting would be a mistake, for the fact cannot be denied that again and again belief has been influenced and formulated by historical events. The converse of this is also true; for it is often impossible to understand the true meaning and significance of historical events without recognizing and taking into consideration the religious belief or beliefs which brought them about. This is not to deny the ultimate divine origin of inspiration and belief; far from that; nevertheless, while holding firmly to belief in divine providence, one is forced to recognize that there are many instances which illustrate this two-fold truth that historical events have profoundly influenced belief in God, and that belief in God has changed the course of history. There would doubtless be differences of opinion regarding details in almost any example temerity might tempt one to cite; but with this probably most people will agree that it is rarely, if ever, that the full significance—and, of course, its ultimate effect—of an historical event can be properly gauged by the generation during which it occurred; whether through lack of knowledge of essential causes at the time, or through prejudice, or through an unbalanced estimate of some of the factors, it is rarely until long after the event that a proper perspective can be gained and its full significance and implications grasped. We shall, therefore, take as illustrations of the mutual influence of history and belief on one another events which happened long ago; and they will be taken from the Old Testament because there cause and effect come out so clearly; and also because in regard to them there is but little scope for controversy. There are many illustrations which could be offered, but quite a few will suffice.

In the investigation to be pursued it will be seen that the first steps are simple enough; it is what is involved that raises some difficult problems; and they are problems which exercise the minds of thinking people today more than they ever did before, and therefore they are problems which must be faced, even if, as yet, no wholly satisfying solutions are forthcoming.

For clearness' sake let us repeat what is to be the preliminary thesis of this paper; the resultant problems will be approached in the latter part: to treat Old Testament *religion* as though it were solely the product of an evolutionary process, without taking into consideration the influence and effect which historical



events had upon belief, would be to ignore one of the main factors which has caused the growth of religious belief. And again: to treat Old Testament *history* as though it were solely a series of political events, without taking into consideration the influence and effect which religious belief has had upon them, would be to ignore one of the main factors which have moulded history.

## I

We will deal first with the influence which history has had upon the belief of the Hebrews. No more striking illustrations could be given than these three historical events: the Exodus, the deliverance at the "Red Sea,"\* and the conquest of Canaan. However differently these events may be explained, there are very few, if any, modern Old Testament scholars who would deny that they were actual historical events.

(a) The reminiscence of the Exodus from Egypt runs through the entire literature of the Hebrews. When one realizes the tenacity of tradition which is always ultimately based on fact, this would be incomprehensible if it had not been a concrete historical event. The pre-eminent influence which this historical fact had upon Hebrew belief centred in the effect it had upon the Hebrews' conception of God; this is already stereotyped in the writing of one of their earliest prophets whose records have been preserved: "I am Yahweh thy God from the land of Egypt" (Hos. xii. 9, Heb. xiii. 4, 10). Such an influence had history on belief that this local God of Sinai, who delivered the Hebrews from their Egyptian oppressors, became their permanent national God; and their belief in Him, handed down from generation to generation, as an article of faith, became ultimately embodied in the national liturgy, as may be seen, *e.g.*, in the liturgical Psalms lxvi. 5 ff., cv. 23 ff., civ. 1 ff.; in so far as one can speak of a Jewish Creed this became a cardinal dogma of that Creed.

(b) Then, as to the deliverance at the "Red Sea"; though this is an inseparable part of the history of the Exodus, its frequent special and individual mention in the literature, clearly witnessing to the conviction of its having actually happened, confirms and emphasizes the truth that the God of Sinai was Israel's God. The remembrance and iteration of this historical fact similarly runs through Hebrew literature and contributes to, if it does not initiate, the doctrine of Yahweh as the Deliverer of the nation; thus a further dogma in the belief of the people was formulated.

\* The Hebrew *Yam Suph*, "Sea of reeds," has nothing to do with the Red Sea as we understand it.



(c) And lastly, the conquest of and settlement in the Promised Land, an historical event brought about, as constantly insisted upon, by the express will of the national God, ultimately resulted in the God of Sinai becoming the God of the Holy Land. It is well to note how often the Exodus from Egypt, of which the deliverance at the "Red Sea" was an integral part, is spoken of in close connection with the fact that the national God, as the God of the Promised Land, had granted this land as an *inheritance* to His people; and this, again, became a dogma of Jewish belief, the attribute of Giver being added to that of Deliverer.

To deal fully with the influence and effect which the historical events of the conquest of, and settlement in, Canaan had upon the belief of the Israelites is a subject which is obviously far too large to enter upon here; it must suffice merely to call attention to the syncretistic worship which arose through the mixture of Baal cults with the worship of Yahweh, a debased type of religion which even the great work of the prophets was unable to purify; to effect this nothing less than the annihilation of both the northern and southern kingdoms was necessary. It must, however, be noted that this shows that historical events may influence belief in a bad as well as in a good direction.

Space compels us to restrict ourselves to these three illustrations, out of many; we need but to refer to such others as the historical event of the Kingship of David, with which, later, Messianic doctrine became inseparably connected, and to the Exile, with its overwhelming effect and influence upon the religion of Israel, for the fact to be realized of how immense was the influence which history exercised upon belief. To ignore this fact would be to blind oneself to the connection between cause and effect; and yet how often it happens that it is ignored, or at any rate not sufficiently taken into consideration. True, this cutting asunder of history and belief has affected New Testament study more than that of the Old; one has only to point to the distinction not infrequently made between "the historical Jesus" and the "Christ of belief," to show this; nevertheless, in regard to the Old Testament, too, there is an indispensable need to study the influence of history on belief if the religion of Israel is to be properly understood and its connection with historical events realized. Moreover, one may not forget that the religion of Israel was the original basis of the Christian religion, and the latter cannot be scientifically studied apart from the former.

History, then, exercised a great influence on the religion of Israel.



## II

But if it is true to say that history had so much to do with religious development—or degeneration, in at least one outstanding case—it is no less true to say that religious belief has often strongly influenced the course of history. We will content ourselves with a single illustration here. For a considerable period after the Israelites entered Canaan the tribes lived apart, without cohesion; the result of this was for them grievous. The Song of Deborah bears witness to the fact that their position was as dangerous as it was intolerable: “the highways were unoccupied” (or, according to the suggestive marginal rendering of the Revised Version, “the caravans ceased,” Judg. v. 6)—i.e., ordinary intercourse was interrupted; and this was because of the menacing attitude of Israel’s enemies, who not unnaturally resented the presence of the intruders into their land. This state of affairs was, however, only a preliminary to worse things; for it was clearly the intention of the stronger elements among the earlier possessors of the land to effect, by a concerted movement, a radical and lasting expulsion of the Israelites from western Palestine: “the kings came and fought, then fought the kings of Canaan, in Taanach by the waters of Megiddo” (Judg. v. 19). It cannot be doubted that the course of Israelite history would have been different from what it was had not a union of some of the tribes taken place, thanks to the rallying-cry whereby Deborah and Barak gathered their forces; with a three-fold heralding of the name of Yahweh (Judg. v. 2, 3) the battle-song opens which tells of what happened. It is certain that the proclaiming of the name of Yahweh their God was the one thing which was able to arouse the tribes to action and self-assertion. The victory of these Israelite tribes over the Canaanite kings was overwhelming in its moral effect upon the victors, even though it does not appear to have resulted in any immediate further acquisition of territory. But from our present point of view the significant fact is that belief—belief in Yahweh, the God of Sinai—both influenced and moulded history here.

This one illustration of the effect of religious belief on the course of history will suffice; a little thought will soon suggest others.

## III

It is fully realized that what has so far been said is largely self-evident, though it will not be denied that this mutual influence of history and belief on one another is not always sufficiently taken into account. But we come to consider next some thoughts which suggest themselves from what has been said.



It is one of the central points in the teaching of practically all the prophets that Yahweh is the God of History; in other words, that all which happens in the history of the world is brought about by the will and act of God. A few illustrations of this will be instructive.

According to Amos, the movements of peoples, with all that is involved thereby in the history of the world, is only in accordance with what God designs. He it was who brought the Israelites out of Egypt; He, too, brought the Philistines from Kaphtor,\* and the Aramæans from Kir† (ix. 7). He caused the Amorites, mighty as they were, to be subdued by the Israelite tribes: *Yet destroyed I the Amorite before them, whose height was like the height of the cedars, and he was strong as the oaks; yet I destroyed his fruit from above, and his roots from beneath. Also I brought you up out of the land of Egypt, and led you forty years in the wilderness, to possess the land of the Amorite* (ii. 9, 10). And whensoever a nation sins, and scourging and punishment come upon it, Yahweh sees the sin, and it is from Him that retribution comes: Syria, Philistia, Phoenicia, Ammon, Moab, Israel—all come in review before the prophet's mental vision (i., ii.); he records the sin and the punishment, but each case is prefaced by the words: "thus saith Yahweh." And, above all, it is Yahweh who will bring a fierce and terrible nation, Assyria, to punish Israel for their wrongdoings. Thus, all these historical events among the nations are declared to have been brought about by God.

Isaiah, to give but one other illustration, also proclaims Yahweh as the God of History; he does this in a number of passages. Thus, *e.g.*, he says in vii. 17 ff. that it is Yahweh who will bring the King of Assyria as a scourge upon the people of Judah; in verse 20 we read: *In that day shall Yahweh shave with a razor that is hired, which is in the parts beyond the river (i.e., Euphrates), even with the King of Assyria, the head . . . and it shall also consume the beard.* It is a graphic picture of the way in which God will make use of the King of Assyria to overrun the land of Judah and deplete it. Egypt is also spoken of in the same passage as an instrument which God will utilize for fulfilling His purposes. In another striking passage (ix. 11, 12) the prophet says: *Therefore shall Yahweh raise up against him (i.e., Ephraim) an adversary, Rezin; and he will stir up his (Ephraim's) enemies; the Syrians in front and the Philistines behind, that they may devour Israel with open mouth.* On the other hand, Isaiah declares that after Assyria and Egypt have

\* *I.e.*, Crete, *cp.* Ezek. xxv. 16, where the Cherethites are identified with the Philistines.

† In southern Babylonia.



completed the work which, as the instruments of God, they are to perform in punishing Judah, He will use yet other instruments for the purpose of crushing these nations (x. 5 ff., 12 ff., 24 ff.). But the passage in which this doctrine of Yahweh as the God of History is stated in the most explicit manner is xiv. 24-27; this must be quoted in full in order that its significance may be realized: *Yahweh of hosts hath sworn, saying: Surely as I have thought, so doth it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so doth it stand, (viz.) that I will break the Assyrian in my land, and upon my mountains tread him under foot; then shall his yoke depart from off them (i.e., the people of Judah), and his burden shall depart from off their shoulder. This is the purpose that is purposed upon the whole earth; and this is the hand that is stretched out upon all the nations. For Yahweh of hosts hath purposed, and who shall disannul it? And his hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it back?* This passage is profoundly important and interesting for the doctrine we are considering; other pre-exilic prophets had taught that Yahweh was the God of History, but primarily in so far as this concerned, directly or indirectly, their own people; Isaiah, however, was the first to proclaim Him as the God of History in the universal sense: "This is the purpose that is purposed upon *the whole earth*; and this is the hand that is stretched out upon *all the nations*."

We are well aware that some prominent Old Testament scholars deny the Isaianic authorship of this passage, as well as others which contain historical prophecies, regarding them as post-exilic and therefore written after the events prophesied; this is, however, by no means the case among all critics; so outstanding a critical scholar as Duhm, for example, insists on the Isaianic authorship of this passage, rightly maintaining, apart from other reasons, that there is not a single word in the whole of it which could not have been written by Isaiah.\* Accepting then the Isaianic authorship of this passage, and taking in conjunction with it a number of other passages which contain prophecies of historical events, some questions very naturally arise in regard to them; and they are questions which cannot be put aside, they demand an answer, and some attempt must therefore be made to answer them.

#### IV

How are we to explain to ourselves the way whereby the knowledge of future historical events came into the mind of a prophet? What parts, respectively, did the natural and the supernatural play?

\* *Das Buch Jesaja*, pp. xii, 98 f. (1914).



Are we to suppose that the prophet was a purely passive instrument in the hands of God? Or are we to see in the prophet merely a man of extraordinary perception and foresight? These are the kind of questions which force themselves upon the mind when reading passages such as those referred to; and though it may well be doubted that answers satisfactory to everybody can be given, that is no reason why the attempt should not be made.

If the subject be approached with an entirely unbiassed mind, and if all the factors be taken into consideration, one thing, at any rate, emerges, the validity of which must, we believe, be conceded—namely, this: one can eliminate either the natural or the supernatural; for if, with some scholars, the existence of everything supernatural be denied, we are faced with the difficulty that the prophets must have been greatly deluded men, because they rarely claim to speak in their own name; they were convinced that the messages regarding future historical events came to them from outside of themselves, that they were imparted by an external power; in a word, that God Himself infused this knowledge into their consciousness. But if all the idea of supernatural working was imaginary, the prophets were suffering from delusion. Yet how is this to be reconciled with the acknowledged fact that in most cases the historical events prophesied did actually come to pass? To urge that all the passages containing historical prophecies were the work of later editors would make such a complete hash of the text of the Hebrew Bible that we should be confronted with a problem which would defy solution; the most modest literary acumen would repudiate such an idea; common sense would be outraged by it. That objection may be set aside. The prophets, everybody acknowledges, were men of extraordinary insight and perception, intensely sincere and honest; their historical prophecies came true for the most part; they were not deluded there; why, then, should they be deluded in the oft-expressed conviction that they were guided by a supernatural power in making these historical prophecies? To eliminate the supernatural, therefore, causes a difficulty. If, on the other hand, the purely natural be eliminated, and it be claimed that the prophets were merely passive receptacles of the divine word—and there are still people who maintain this—then we are faced with the awkward fact that there are instances in which a prophecy about some historical event did *not* come true; in other words, that the divinely inspired utterance was a mistaken one. A few illustrations of this will be instructive: Isaiah predicted that the capture of Samaria would take place at about the same time as the fall of Damascus (B.C. 732), whereas this



did not occur until ten years later (Isa. xvii. 1-3). The same prophet antedated the invasion of Judah by some thirty years (Isa. iii. 16-24, v. 24, vii. 17-25, viii. 7, 8), and he antedated the invasion of Egypt (if Egypt is meant in Isa. xx. 3, which can hardly be doubted) by more than fifty; and when the former invasion took place the Assyrian forces did not advance against Jerusalem from the north, as predicted in Isa. x. 28-33, but from the direction of Lachish to the south-west of the city (see 2 Kings xviii. 14; Isa. xxxvi. 2); "hence it is apparent that whilst Isaiah's faith in the deliverance which divine providence had in reserve for Zion was signally vindicated, there entered nevertheless into his expectations of the future more of human miscalculation than is often supposed."\* Thus, to eliminate the purely natural also involves a difficulty. Therefore, in considering this question of the prediction of historical events it seems reasonable to postulate both a supernatural and a natural element.

When we come to enquire as to the relative parts played by the divine and the human elements, it is well to note that among the prophets themselves difficulties on the subject arose; at any rate, there is one striking illustration of this in the case of the prophet Habakkuk; this is well worth dwelling upon. Habakkuk was horrified by the sins and violence of the most powerful among his people's enemies, the Chaldæans. He repeatedly appeals to God to vindicate His righteousness and justice by punishing this enemy; but in vain; and he is at a loss to understand this. At last, however, there breaks in upon his consciousness the realization that this enemy of his nation, "terrible and dreadful," is God's *instrument* which He is about to use for the purpose of chastising his own people, among whom, as the prophet says, *the law is slacked and judgement doth never go forth; for the wicked compass about the righteous, therefore judgement goeth forth perverted* (Hab. i. 4). Of this instrument the prophet, speaking in the name of Yahweh, says: *Behold ye among the nations, and regard, and wonder marvellously; for I work a work in your days, which ye will not believe, though it be told you. For, lo, I raise up the Chaldæans, that bitter and hasty nation, which march through the breadth of the earth . . . (i. 5 ff.)*. Thus, the prophet understands why this nation of the Chaldæans has not been punished: God is using it as His instrument to fulfil His purpose of chastising His sinful and faithless people. So far so good. But then another and more difficult problem presents itself. The prophet, in thinking about this divine instrument, singled out for the service of God, realizes that it is a people bitter and hasty, terrible and dreadful, who fly like an eagle

\* Wade, *The Book of the Prophet Isaiah*, pp. xxix f. (1911).



upon the prey, scorning kings and princes; a guilty people that does not acknowledge God, but whose might is its god. Thereupon a new difficulty arises in his mind. He argues with himself somewhat after this manner: God is from everlasting, One who is holy, who is of purer eyes than to behold evil. He cannot look upon—*i.e.*, acquiesce in—evil; and yet this instrument of His choice, which He “has ordained for judgement,” and “established for correction”—this instrument, this nation, is itself evil, one that “dealeth treacherously,” that “sacrificeth and burneth incense” to idols! How can such a nation be God’s instrument? How can He who is all-good make use of that which is evil? The difficulty was very real; one only wonders why it had never occurred before. But it shows that the dogma of God as the God of History suggested puzzling problems to some even in pre-exilic times; and with them we must feel profound sympathy.

With the details of the solution of the problem which satisfied Habakkuk we cannot deal now; he was merely mentioned as an illustration of the fact that even among some of the prophets problems arose difficult to solve when the thought was suggested as to how far the divine and how far the human element entered in when prophecies about historical events were in question.\* But Habakkuk does not, in fact, help to solve the problem; true, he helps us in another way by his wise attitude in face of what he confesses that he is unable to understand; for he protests, in effect, that *one* difficulty shall not weaken his faith in God when there exist so many other things to strengthen it—a fine lesson in the sense of proportion; but, evidently, he was not in a position to say how far God spoke through him and how far he was uttering what he himself thought. Habakkuk believed as much as any of the prophets in the dogma that God is the God of History; but he was the first, so far as we know, to realize that in the face of the facts of history a tremendous difficulty was involved in that dogma. Habakkuk does not doubt that God is the God of History, but he does wonder how God, who is all-good, can utilize an evil instrument in shaping history. But having got thus far, would that he could have got a little farther and asked himself whether it really was true that God was the God of History; and if so, in what way! It is, of course, realized that this cannot be expected of one living in the early part of the sixth century B.C.; but it is a question which forces itself upon the mind, and drags others, somewhat disconcerting, in its train. It is a question which must be faced, and Habakkuk’s doubt emboldens one to do so.

\* The words in Hab. ii. 1-4 should be especially noted in this connection.



## V

How if the divine messages in which historical events were involved were misunderstood and misinterpreted by the prophets who received them? It will be conceded that a mortal being, prophet though he be, must, when undergoing a psychical experience, envisage things in a way utterly different from that in which a spiritual being, above all the Lord of spirits, does. He may hear words and see visions which are presented to him when in a state of trance—*i.e.*, under supernormal conditions—which are full of profound spiritual meaning. When he comes to his normal state it is for him to interpret to *himself* what he has seen and heard before delivering his message to others. He may or he may not, being a man, have understood in whole or in part what he has seen and heard; but in any case, if the matter of which he has been the recipient is connected with some coming historical event—and it is of such alone that we are now thinking—he will interpret it according to his way of looking at things, and this will, generally speaking, be such as conforms to the general mental outlook of the world-period during which he lives; for he is, even though he be a prophet, the child of his age.

Now a large proportion, if not all, of the *historical* predictions in the Old Testament concern wars, directly or indirectly. The prophet receives the message the purport of which he understands to be that a war, or something involving a war, will come to pass at some future time, and, in accordance with the ideas of his day, he interprets this as being God's method of punishing His sinful people; in other words, he believes that the war will be brought about by the will of God. What we cannot help asking ourselves is this: Can it really have been by the will of God that the war was to take place and that it did take place? May it not have been that in cases such as these the prophet was mistaken as to the real purport of the message he had received? In this connection there is the following fact to be noted: if one studies the occasions on which a predicted war actually took place it will be found almost always that, considered from the purely historical point of view, it would in all human probability have taken place in any case owing to the political conditions of the time and quite irrespectively of whether the Israelite nation existed or not.

We may well believe, though with reservations, the prophetic teaching to be true when it is maintained that God is the God of History; but are we also to believe that He is, or ever was, the God of wars? Quite obviously the prophets thought so. Do we think so? For ourselves, we are forced to the con-



viction that in so far as the prophets, in predicting a war, believed that it would be brought about by the will of God, they misapprehended the divine character and misinterpreted the message they had received. It was a wrong inference drawn from a divine message; the message might enable a prophet to foresee that a war would take place, but the message did not mean that it would take place by the will of God. This is not to deny that the prophets were divinely commissioned, nor does it imply that they did not speak in the name of God; it only means that in so far as this particular subject was concerned, the natural element predominated, and they were unable to enter into the mind of God.

It will be understood that we do not mean to imply that History is always or necessarily connected with wars, but only that so much of the course of History has been decided by wars. War has been to such a large extent man's method of settling his relations with his neighbours—though continued unsettlement has usually resulted sooner or later—that one cannot dissociate History from wars. Whatever truth there is in the prophetic teaching of God being the God of History, it is difficult to believe that *that* large part of History which is concerned with wars and their conduct should come within the scope of the dogma. Not that we should contend that war may not be justified at times. A man cannot see a woman attacked by another man without attempting to knock him down; similarly, a nation cannot, or should not, stand by with indifference if it sees a weaker nation unjustifiably molested. War may be justified—men being what they are—and, provided that the motives be wholly disinterested, who shall say that under such conditions war may not have divine sanction? But, in any case, that is exceptional, and there is nothing to show that such exceptions came within the prophets' purview.

## VI

The prophetic doctrine that God is the God of History presents us with a problem, then; and the difficulty of the problem is increased when we are forced to recognize the fact that History has been so intimately connected with wars; for it might well be argued that if God is the God of History, then wars must be His concern, and He must, as the prophets taught, be also the God of wars. But if, as we have contended, God is not the God of wars, then, it may be urged, He is not the God of History. Upon which it will be asked further: If that be so, does the Almighty play no part in shaping human history? That, we take it, few people would be prepared to affirm if they believed in God at all.



The difficulty, therefore, which doubtless many have felt if they have pondered over this prophetic doctrine that God is the God of History, is, how to reconcile our belief in an ethical and omnipotent God who shapes the history of mankind, with the fact that that history is so largely made up of a long record of wars and tumults, the results of envy, hatred, malice, suspicion and fear?

The reply, put in the briefest possible way, and shorn of many subsidiary points, we believe to be as follows: It is certain that God did not create man an automaton; man has a free will, and is intended to work out his own destiny by means of that free will. But man, in working out his destiny in world history, commits innumerable follies, of which fighting is one of the most prodigious. But if the Almighty were to step in every time this folly was perpetrated, and stop it, the action of free will on the part of man, which is an indispensable condition of human progress, would cease, and God's handiwork, man, would become useless. Therefore, since God cannot deny Himself, man is left free; and he wages his wars according to his free will, the possession granted to him by the will of God. Against this it cannot be urged that it involves self-limitation on the part of the Deity, because the endowment of human free will is part of the divine scheme.

That is one consideration; it is that which approaches the problem primarily from the human side. We are not supposing that it solves the problem; but, at any rate, it supports the contention that in so far as the prophets held that wars were brought about by the will of God they were mistaken.

But there is a further consideration. It is quite impossible to believe that there is no guiding hand of Providence in the great drama presented in the history of mankind. If we believe in God at all we must believe that He is interested in man and in man's doings, and that therefore He does in a very real sense shape world history. It has been well said that "the significance of history lies primarily in its being a process in which social, moral, and spiritual values are realized";\* we shall all agree with that; how then can the divine rôle be eliminated from the process? Not that the providential order is to be interpreted as though history were to be regarded as "akin to the unrolling of a cinematograph film which has been prepared beforehand"; no, the divine action in history is to be seen in the over-ruling and turning to good the follies of man, above all, wars. Not that that over-ruling implies the curbing of man's free will, for directing and diverting do not involve forcing. Man remains free, by the will of God; and, through the guidance

\* Matthews, *God in Christian Thought and Experience*, p. 269 (1930).



of God, slowly progresses. The process of world history has shown that he progresses. He progresses in spite of retrograde steps; he progresses but slowly because he is so slow to follow the divine prompting and guidance.

There is a "divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will."

This, we fear, has been put crudely and inadequately; but it is somewhat on these lines, properly worked out, that it may be possible, we do not say to solve the problem, but at least to obtain some glimpse of the truth.

W. O. E. OESTERLEY.

---

---

## THE ADMINISTRATION OF HOLY BAPTISM— INDISCRIMINATE OR NOT?\*

ONE quotation will suffice to introduce our subject. Dr. Gore in one of his latest books wrote as follows: "It is true—most lamentably true—that since the days of Constantine, by the recognition of indiscriminate baptism (and in other ways) . . . the Church of Christ has dared absolutely to reverse the method of its Master, and thereby has lost . . . its moral power as a corporate body." That such a sentence is possible must be my justification to-day. Amongst ourselves there is little or no indiscriminate adult baptism, and the scope of our discussion is limited to infant baptism.

*Doctrine.*—I ought to state what I believe to be the teaching of the Church as to baptism. In baptism we receive regeneration; we are born again. We can never be re-baptized because we can never be un-baptized. Regeneration must not be confused with conversion. Regeneration is a change of state; conversion is a change of mind. Regeneration may precede conversion, as in the case of so many of us as have been converted. Regeneration may follow conversion, as in the case of St. Paul, St. Augustine, and those adults who are being baptized in the mission field to-day.

In baptism, then, we are born again. Now consider the analogy of natural birth. Natural birth is not enough. The child who has been born needs then to be surrounded with those conditions which are favourable to the development and growth of human life. If we can imagine a young child taken immediately and placed in an environment where none of these conditions

\* An address given to the Synod of St. Albans in the Cathedral Church, June, 1931.



prevail, as, *e.g.*, on an island among wild animals, suckled by a wolf, then it might be truthfully said "Good were it for that child if he had never been born." Similarly I submit that if a child after baptism is taken back to what are virtually heathen surroundings, with no Christian environment, it might be said with equal truth, "Good were it for that child if he had never been baptized."

Two other illustrations I will suggest without stopping to develop them. First that of seed sown in the ground, which cannot thrive unless it has the necessary warmth, moisture, etc., and receives the necessary attention; and secondly that of a father who puts his boy's name down for a Public School directly he is born. That his boy should be potentially a member of the school is not enough. He must go to the school and live in its atmosphere and receive its education if he is to receive its advantages. Granted that baptism is much more than the entering of a name in a register, and that the membership is immediate and not prospective, this illustration, like all others, must not be too strongly pressed. Hence, in the doctrine of baptism, the idea of fellowship, or membership, cannot be too firmly maintained. Fellowship is life. Fellowship in the Church, with Christ the Head, and with one another, the members, is essential for eternal life. Without this a baptized child may almost be described as spiritually still-born.

We now look for a moment at the Bible and the early Church. We are, of course, all aware that there is no positive evidence for infant baptism in the Bible at all. The most that we can say is that it is possible, some will say probable, that infants were baptized in Bible times. I submit that we must beware of laying too much emphasis on the beautiful text "Suffer the little children to come unto Me." Here let it be said at once that we will all give one another credit for earnestly desiring to bring all little children to Christ. We will take it for granted that all of us would rather suffer many things ourselves sooner than come between any little child and the Saviour who loved children so well. But does it necessarily follow that we shall indiscriminately baptize? Are all the little children who are brought to the font really and truly being brought to Christ? We ought to make sure of this point. If parents are regarding it as a formality, if they are isolating it from real life, if looking upon it as a charm, then we ought, in the interest of the children, as well as of their own, to ask them to consider what baptism really means. Baptism is too solemn a sacrament to be cheapened and degraded. It is a pearl of great price, and we have our Lord's direct command not to cast our pearls in all directions.



But some will say, What becomes of the children who are unbaptized and die? There is not one word in the Bible to suggest that unbaptized infants go to hell; and I do not suppose that there is a single member of the Synod who holds any such doctrine. Augustinianism in its crude form has held sway over the minds of men for many centuries; perhaps we are all of us influenced by it to a certain extent to-day. It has been faithfully dealt with by Dr. Williams in his Bampton Lectures for 1924. Its influence has been largely eliminated from the Prayer Book of 1928. It cuts little ice now. We do not believe with St. Augustine that any little children go to hell. Hell is home-made. Hell is the torturing agony of a self-accusing conscience. To speak of any child suffering the torments of hell is to deny that God is love and to fly straight in the face of common sense. Nor do I find any foundation in the Bible for Dr. Williams's suggested theory of limbo, though lack of time prevents me from saying more about this at the present moment.

In the Early Church infant baptism was by no means universal. In the second century we find parents pressing forward to have their infants baptized, probably because they were interpreting the third chapter of St. John's Gospel rather crudely; but they were not always encouraged to do so by the clergy. By the fourth century we find them holding back both for themselves and their children, because they were impressed by the grave danger of post-baptismal sin. At this time, many, including Constantine, were not baptized until they were on their death-bed. The clause in our Nicene Creed "One Baptism for the remission of sins" historically, in the mind of the writer, can bear no reference to infant baptism. It was probably drawn up by St. Cyril of Jerusalem *circa* 363, who incorporated in his creed certain sentences which had been fixed at Nicæa in 325. St. Cyril is responsible for the last part of the creed, and infant baptism was almost if not entirely unknown in the Church at Jerusalem. I therefore submit that neither in the Bible nor in the early Church do we find anything to justify us in the indiscriminate baptism of infants.

Next I ask you to consider that the love of God is broader than the measure of man's mind. I do not believe that God will allow any little child to suffer because you and I, acting from the highest motives, have suggested that baptism be, not indeed altogether abandoned, but postponed; and there are few services more impressive than that of adult baptism. I once had a conversation with a priest on this subject and he said, "It seems to me that you are limiting the power of the Holy Spirit," by which he meant that I was suggesting that the Holy Spirit



could not work miracles with a child even when the child was brought up in a non-Christian atmosphere. To which I answered, "It seems to me that that is exactly what you are doing, because you are suggesting that the Holy Spirit cannot work outside baptism!" He admitted defeat. May I try to put it to you by means of a formula, which I will ask the Synod carefully to note? Let it be granted that the one indispensable necessity for every human being is Christ—

Christ without baptism is one of God's possibilities;  
Baptism without Christ is one of man's futilities.

Now I wish to examine one or two very common expressions. And the first is "to give the child the benefit of the doubt." Will you please give attention to another phrase which may not be without significance? I mean, "the doubtfulness of the benefit" in some cases. I have been told by a prominent member of the Synod that if I make use of this expression I shall alienate the sympathy of every Anglo-Catholic member of the Synod. I have far too much respect for the intelligence of the Anglo-Catholic clergy to suppose any such thing. As a matter of fact, many of the ideas I am putting before you to-day I received nearly thirty years ago from one of the leaders of the Anglo-Catholic movement; I refer to Canon Brooke, of St. John the Divine, Kennington, and I have never known any man more perfectly to fulfil the ideal of a parish priest. The methods I am going to propose were set on foot by him in the parish many years ago, and I am assured by the present vicar that they are working very well. Nor do I think that I shall alienate the sympathy of the Evangelicals. To them I make this submission, which I borrow from Dr. Williams: If the charge of using the sacraments as charms, or in a mechanical way, can anywhere be sustained against us clergy, it is in this matter of infant baptism. He goes on to say that this charge may derive some force from the curious stratagems employed by Jesuits in North America who, under cover of conversation with the parents, would secretly flick a few drops of water over a child, whispering, "Ego baptizo te," so as to add as many souls as possible to the Kingdom of God. From my friends the Modernists I do not anticipate any serious trouble. Therefore with unabated confidence I propose to examine the phrase for which I alone am responsible "the doubtfulness of the benefit."

First to the child himself. Now I have been informed by a keen psychologist that it is by no means unreasonable to suppose that a very real gift is given even to an unconscious child. Where the superficial consciousness is undeveloped, the subconscious may be especially alive and active, as in the case of



children. But how is the gift given? The Spirit of God is not given as a man may pump wind into a tyre, but by a person being placed in an atmosphere in which the Spirit especially operates; and if either this atmosphere is wanting or the person refuses to profit by it, then the gift, to say the least, is of doubtful benefit.

This expression, "the doubtfulness of the benefit," may apply to others besides the child. People sometimes speak as if it were always better to baptize, on the ground that if the child turns out well, all is well; but if he turns out badly, at any rate no harm has been done. But is this really so? It seems to me to be far from the truth. May we use another illustration? A schoolmaster is asked to admit into his school a boy who comes from bad surroundings. He hesitates, and finally gives the boy the benefit of the doubt and receives him into the fellowship of the school. The boy goes from bad to worse. Is he the only sufferer? The whole school suffers, and the Head himself is broken-hearted at what takes place. In the same way, if a baptized person is living a Godless and immoral life, the whole Church suffers and the Head of the Church is wounded in the house of His friends. Who can deny that the fact that England to-day swarms with baptized heathen is the source of real weakness to the Church? As Dr. Gore says, it has lost its moral power as a corporate body. Many really honest and conscientious people have been put off baptism and Church membership by the inconsistent lives of those who have been baptized. Occasion has been given to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme. Therefore, I ask that this expression "the benefit of the doubt" may not be used unless the other expression "the doubtfulness of the benefit" has been fully explored.

One other common phrase I wish to glance at; it is this: "Why penalize the child because of the sins of the parents?" But the poor child is already penalized. This truth is as old at least as the Second Commandment. The child is penalized by being born of un-Christian parents. We must face facts, however ugly. That poor unconscious infant lying there will in all human probability be brought up on entirely worldly principles. You cannot isolate the child from the family. You must look at the child on the background of the parents. The way out of the trouble is evangelization, but it seems to me that until that has taken place, we have no real justification in baptizing. The last words of the first Gospel do not tell us to make discipleship possible by baptizing, but to make baptism possible by discipleship.

This may have some bearing on another argument commonly used. It is this: "When we come to try to reclaim a fallen



boy or girl, we have a strong lever ready to hand in the fact that he or she has already been baptized and is in honour bound to respond to live up to the baptismal vows." There is certainly force in this argument, and we must give it its full value. But are we entirely without any such lever even in the case of the unbaptized? Are not all men the children of God? Are we not all in honour bound to use the powers God has given us in obedience to the Giver? Granted that the fact of baptism makes the appeal more forcible, yet I submit that even without baptism we are not by any means devoid of all appeal.

My lord, I am going to ask you, and I hope the Synod will back me up, to issue directions throughout the diocese with regard to the administration of Holy Baptism. I say, throughout the diocese, because if it is right for us to take any step, we must all pull together. If a priest acting on the highest motives, and very reluctantly, feels obliged to suggest to the parents that baptism be postponed, and they have only to run round the corner and be received by another priest with open arms, then we are a house divided against itself and cannot stand. We must work together. And not in this one diocese only. Many of us live near the borders of another diocese. My own parish is situated within a ten-minutes run of either London or Chelmsford. I hope I am not transgressing if I go further and express the hope that your lordship will bring this matter before the bishops assembled at Lambeth and request that action may be taken in every diocese.

It may be of some assistance if I hand to your lordship some literature which the Vicar of St. John the Divine, Kennington, has kindly sent me. (I have only one criticism to make of these papers, and that is that the child is consistently referred to as "it." This is a mistake I trust we shall avoid.) They contain these two clear principles at least.

1. That no baptism should take place in the church without previous notice being given. This rule has been in force at Cheshunt now for some years and has certainly worked well. (At any rate people have started thinking.) This will necessitate an interview, and to this the greatest importance must be attached. I have here a letter received only last Saturday. It comes from a woman I have known from childhood. She went off to the Registry Office to be married, I do not know why. The other evening she sent a note about the baptism of a child, and I sent an answer to the effect that I should like to have an interview. She came, but not her husband. I said I would come round and see him the following evening. We had a pleasant and peaceful interview; I tried to point out to him, and he agreed, that an Englishman hates anything like hypoc-



ris, and what he says he means. So, he would not wish to stand at the font and make solemn promises which he did not mean. I left them to think it over. On Saturday I got this letter in which the wife says that "things are going to be very different in future; I am quite willing to be confirmed, and if you want a communicant to stand as Godfather my father is willing to act." I replied thanking her for her nice letter and asking that she and her husband would pray for me that night, as I promised to pray for them. The child was baptized next day, and there only remains the promise to be redeemed, as I believe it will be. Surely this incident proves the value of the interview.

The Synod will not think me impertinent if I say that a priest should approach this interview only after prayer. He must say to himself, "I am here as the representative of Jesus Christ." He will try to deal with the utmost tenderness and consideration with the poor and the ignorant and those who have had no chance of knowing better, though this does not imply that he will in all cases baptize. I do not know that I have ever refused point-blank to baptize a child, but I have often asked the parents to go away and think it over seriously, and not to come back unless they can take the vows sincerely on their lips, and in some cases they have not returned. He will try to deal with moral courage with those who, though possibly rich and of high social standing, have no intention whatever of altering their worldly way of living. I was told yesterday of a baptism being arranged for a certain time that it might be followed by a cocktail party. "I will speak of Thy testimonies also, even before kings, and will not be ashamed." One or two instances of such moral courage will, I believe, entail no loss to the child and add enormously to the respect in which the Church is held.

2. That at least one of the Godparents should be a communicant.\* Canon 29 of 1603 lays it down that no one shall stand as sponsor who has not received Holy Communion. Certainly if we use the 1928 Book no one can possibly answer the questions with sincerity unless a communicant. Here again the difficulty is greater, and also the scandal, in the case of those of high social position. Which of us does not know of the well-to-do sponsor who is brought in because he is well-to-do, not because he has well done? On the Tuesday following the ceremony, if anyone were to suggest in his club that he had turned religious and was going to Communion, or was going to renounce the doubtful

\* In some parishes there is a method by which certain Church workers undertake the duties of sponsorship. There are doubtless possibilities here, but there is a limit to the extent to which this scheme may be profitably used.



story, or fight against the love of money, or give up gambling, there would be much derisive laughter and from none louder than from himself, and yet on Sunday that man stood at the font and solemnly swore lifelong loyalty to Jesus Christ. That is the kind of scandal that ought to be stopped, and we ought to have the moral courage to stop it. Our subscription lists might dwindle, but we should keep our souls intact.

I must now leave it to other members of the Synod to make further suggestions or criticisms. I can only thank you, my lord, for your confidence in allowing me to bring this subject forward, on which I have felt keenly for many years, and pray that whatever the outcome of our deliberations it may lead to the restoration to the Holy Sacrament of Baptism of that dignity and sacredness of which it has been largely robbed, to the salvation of souls and to the greater glory of God.

NOTE.—In the discussion that followed these points were brought out:—

- (1) That Holy Baptism should sometimes be administered at Morning or Evening Prayer, as ordered in the Prayer Book.
- (2) That greater care should be taken in the administration.
- (3) That if it is right for one sponsor to be a communicant, on the ground that only a communicant can sincerely answer the questions, then it is right that all of them should be communicants.
- (4) That to foster loyalty between the clergy this matter should be discussed at ruridecanal Chapters.
- (5) That if the suggestions embodied in this paper be carried out, it puts the parish priest in the position of a judge, and this would be terribly difficult.

The speaker answered this by saying that the priest often is obliged to judge; he has to judge who is and who is not a notorious evil-liver; as to who ought and who ought not to be presented for confirmation; he cannot escape. Also if he hears confessions he is obliged to judge.

- (6) That God has ordered baptism; to postpone it is man's idea.

The answer was: But did God order unconditional baptism? and is the command "Go and baptize" or "Go and make disciples" (first), "baptizing them" (afterwards)? In other words, the last paragraph of the Gospel according to St. Matthew does not tell us to make discipleship possible by baptizing, but to make baptism possible by discipleship.

The Bishop of St. Albans said that he would like to see the service of Holy Baptism used as a great welcoming of new members into the Church of Christ.

C. B. LAW.



## WORSHIP AND SACRIFICE

It is noteworthy how the practice of worship by sacrifice has persisted through the history of the human race, and that in two forms sometimes separated and sometimes united. In its earlier form it is believed the idea was that of the common meal in which the god took part. In other, though not much later, forms it was the whole that was offered. "The latter type of sacrifice," writes Mr. T. H. Robinson in his *Outline Introduction to the History of Religions*, "has nothing of the idea of communion in it, and becomes primarily a gift to the god."

This, it would seem, is because it satisfies a certain human need felt by all men. In the Christian Church the Sacrifice of the Eucharist, the Mass, is found universally in all countries, hot and cold; in different races, white and coloured; offered by men of all classes, rich and poor; interpreting the needs of learned and simple; driven out by Puritanism, yet reviving among men trained by tradition in different associations; recognized at once in literature or on the stage by men to whom it is unfamiliar in practice. It works out in a variety of practice from the elaborateness of the Eastern Liturgy to the utter simplicity of an Anglican "plain celebration," in High Mass and Low Mass, yet with one common structure and a persistent unity of form.

The explanations of the nature of this sacrifice, however, do not come home to us as very real, especially when complicated, for instance, with theories about what avails for original, and what for actual, sin. We feel somehow that very often they have been framed to justify practices already alive, that they are rationalizations of experience. That is the way doctrines usually grow, and indeed it is often for that reason that they have their interest.

Is there a better explanation to be found from the study of psychology—that is, in the abiding nature of man himself?

### I

There are two great universal human experiences felt by all men from time to time. They are closely connected, but are different. We are all familiar with a passive sense of helplessness that comes over us. No less do we know an active sense of dissatisfaction with ourselves rising at times to a feeling of disgust. In the technical language of psychology they are the outcome of the instincts of submission and of self-negation. Even if the instinct is ultimately but one, it works out in two ways—in a craving for support, or in a desire to escape from



oneself. With its contrary, the instinct of self-assertion, it is present, writes Mr. McDougall, "in the gregarious human species, and plays an immense part in the social life of mankind."

In religion this sense of helplessness leads to a desire for Grace. This is the "feeling of absolute dependence" in which Schleiermacher said that religion consisted. "It is the feeling that the common man finds expressed for him in Charles Wesley's *Rock of Ages*:

Nothing in my hand I bring,  
Simply to Thy Cross I cling.

It is no explanation of this experience, still less a condemnation of it, to connect it with the same self-depreciating instinct which makes a dog crouch before his master.

For man, unlike the dog, feels further that there is a bar to Grace in his sin, that it thwarts his efforts and cuts off his force. He feels he has sinned by his misuse of the instinct of self-assertion. He desires forgiveness, restoration, and strength. He looks for means of grace.

This side of man's nature is met by the Holy Communion. There is a close analogy in the needs of physical life. He seeks the "strengthening and refreshing of his soul by the Body and Blood of Christ as his body is by the bread and wine." In communicating he seeks new life that shall foster growth. He comes for satisfaction, for making up that which is deficient. We say in the Prayer of Humble Access that we come to the Holy Table that He may dwell in us. But this side of the Eucharist is primarily an individual act. It is true we come all together as a rule, but it is the individual's communion with God in Christ that is the chief thing. It emphasizes our self-consciousness, and our dissatisfaction with ourselves. Hence the continual note of its devotion is "I am not worthy."

## II

But there is this other side of man's nature too, the desire to get away from self, to forget oneself. It is that which for a self-centred philosophy like Buddhism leads to a desire for Nirvana, for peace by entire loss of selfhood. Poets have felt it:

In the sea of life enisled

\* \* \* \* \*

We mortal millions live alone.

Why should we mind?—but we do. Wordsworth sees that:

The child whose love is here, at least, doth reap  
One precious gain, that he forgets himself.



And Paul Gerhardt, or rather his translator Robert Bridges, sees that the sight of "the starry heavens above" when it fills "the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe" has this further gain, that:

Man the marvel seeing,  
Forgets his selfish being  
For joy of beauty not his own,

while less gifted hymn-writers no less appeal to a universal experience in crude mission hymns tracing the progress of "All of self and none of Thee" by stages to "None of self and all of Thee." We might multiply examples from philosophers. Pascal headed one of his *Pensées* "Divertissement" (No. 139):

"Let us make the trial," he writes. "Let us leave a king all alone to reflect on himself quite at leisure, without any gratification of the senses, without any care on his mind, without society, and we shall see that a king without distraction is a man full of wretchedness."

Or again in one headed "Ennui":

"Nothing is so insufferable to man as to be completely at rest, without passions, without business, without diversions, without study. He then feels his nothingness, his forlornness, his insufficiency, his dependence, his weakness, his emptiness. There will immediately arise from the depths of his heart weariness, gloom, sadness, fretfulness, vexation, despair."

Man wants to get away from self. That is why he seeks distractions. He wants to get to something bigger and firmer. God, wrote George Herbert, let him keep all these other things but refused him rest "lest he should adore my gifts instead of me," let him "keep them with repining restlessness."

Let him be sick and weary, that at least  
If goodness lead him not, yet weariness  
May toss him to my breast.

The same note is sounded in Lyte's popular *Abide with me*, which has become hackneyed and worn, just as Augustine's famous "Thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts know no rest till they rest on thee," has become threadbare because it appeals to universal spiritual experience and is ever being illustrated by the changes and chances of life.

### III

This instinct of self-negation is the impulse of worship. Just as we get out of ourselves or, as we say, "express" ourselves in a piece of work, just as we escape from self when we live out into a society or undertaking, just as an artist loses himself



in his painting or a singer experiences the full joy of getting out of himself into some great song or chorus, so in worship man escapes into something other and greater than himself. By self-abasement, by "the stoop of the soul that in bending upraises it too," he enters into the life of God. Not by self-annihilation as the Buddhist, or as in certain forms of mysticism, but by the continued activity of the self no longer alone and its own centre. He wants, from time to time, to get out of himself into a round of praise that goes on independently of himself and his moods. He does not want for this side of his being rousing or bright hymns or helpful sermons. These, no doubt, have their place, but they are like stimulants—the more you take them the more exhausted you get. Rather he wants a dignified objective worship such as that of the *opus dei*, the Choir Offices, with their wealth of literature and song, with their sequence of intellectual treasure, of disciplined beauty, of inherited classic forms of prayer and praise, all objective, carried on as an offering to God, all gloriously irrelevant to the ups and downs of his personal experience, into which he can throw himself and for the time at least live out of himself, into something calmer and greater and stronger. And especially when the worship is a thing done—as in the Drama of the Mass, where it is not at the time the coming of Christ in Communion that is sought, the "He in us," but the losing of ourselves in the greater common worship of the Eternal Father through Christ, the "we in Him"—is this end attained and the instinct of escape from self exercised. For common worship is by corporate action, consecrating in addition the herd instinct. In a worshipping congregation we still further come to live out of ourselves.

#### IV

For life is self-expression. Only if you lose your life, at times at least, can you find it. Mere self-renunciation, it has often been pointed out, remains self-centred, till it ends in Nirvana. Peer Gynt, who tried to be "sufficient to himself," first found himself in a madhouse with other lunatics, and was then threatened with loss of his identity by being melted down by the button moulder, and only found his true self in the larger world of Solveig's love and constancy. So worship must be an activity of the whole man sending himself out into a larger world with his fellow-men and the "whole company of heaven."

Hence the vitality of the Mass in human history. It is the chief form of sacrifice in the Church in which man hallows his instinctive self-negation and gets out of himself into a larger world. It is spoiled if we turn it into a means of edification.



There is a place for Evangelism, in the pulpit, in the Press, in the schools. But to try to make the Mass "impressive" is to foster self-consciousness and fatal to worship.

I feel this is a side of Christian life we are failing adequately to meet. For this reason I believe the Church of England loses many to Rome, where, in spite of a foreign language in the Mass, and a form of Choir Office entirely unsuited to the laity, the idea of worship has always been put in the first place. The Oxford Movement has done much to revive the thought of Communion and to provide opportunities for reception of the Sacrament, but the idea of worship has neither been so clearly conceived nor are opportunities for its exercise adequately supplied either in choir or before the altar.

CLEMENT F. ROGERS.

---

---

## LIBERAL CATHOLICS AND THE INCARNATION

THE tentative Christology of the so-called "liberal Catholics" in the Church is interesting and certainly significant. In one respect it is simply the prolongation of a movement that has been under way for a good many years and may be welcomed without hesitance. As an escape from the older bigotry that separated Christianity from other religions harshly as truth is distinguished from falsehood, it offers a genuine broadening of knowledge and experience. And again, as a revolt from the unbalanced emphasis on the deity of the Incarnate which has brought the Christology of Rome to the verge of the monophysite heresy, its insistence on the true manhood of Jesus is thoroughly wholesome. But in the end these "liberal Catholics" leave me puzzled to know how far they are attempting to explain philosophically the orthodox dogma of the Church and how far they are aiming to substitute something radically new for the older belief. If I may say so without presumption, this trouble arises from the fact that they are thinking honestly and fearlessly about the nature of revelation, but have not carried their thoughts through to the end. Their theory of degrees, as I understand it, is a modern refurbishing of the old Thomistic doctrine of analogy, and contains hints of a great truth; but it is a question whether they have grasped the full force of the principle which they invoke to explain—and simplify—the process of revelation. Apparently they do not see that there are two sides to this process leading up to the Incarnation: the instrument *through* which the revelation is made and the human



mind to which the revelation is made. And, failing to observe this very obvious distinction, they tend to confuse the discontinuity of the revelation itself with the continuity of the human response to revelation. Hence the hint of something equivocal in their use of analogy, and the shifting of their attitude towards the divine in Christ, which they speak of now as unique in kind and again seem to reduce to something different in degree only from the divine in other men. At any rate, their presentation of the problem has set me to the task of clarifying, so far as I am able, my own ideas.

The whole question turns, perhaps, on the meaning and function of the Logos. As the matter presents itself to me, we have first a revelation of the Logos through the inanimate world. And by revelation I mean here that behind the order and beauty of lifeless things we are somehow led to infer the activity of an intelligence creating and manipulating the hierarchy of these objects with some conscious design in view, analogous to the manner in which we, in our mortal needs, use the materials at our disposal for some end of our own. And looking at the world at large we derive, or infer, these signs of purpose in an ascending scale from the inert clod of earth to the sublime and majestically moving stars. There is little apparent meaning in the stone at my feet; whereas the pattern of the sky, as Kant admitted and as the nineteenth Psalm long before him stated in nobler language, is eloquent to us of the glory of God. But from one to the other, from the lowliest clod of earth to the utmost reach of the heavens, the scale of evidence is continuous.

Then comes a break in the continuity. The inanimate object appears to be an instrument of purpose for the use of some animate agent, and in no sense of the word for itself. There is no heart or mind in the blazing planet to benefit from its own beauty, there is in it no power of self-development and direction, any more than in the dumbest fragment of matter in the street. But the animate creature has an end in and for itself. The seed develops into the perfect plant, the germ into the perfect animal. There is, as Aristotle would say, a soul in these things. As a consequence the suggestions of a divine purpose are clearer, seem to come to us more directly and intimately, from the animate than from the inanimate world. And, again, there is continuity in this higher realm of nature as there was in the lower. From the amœba, moving almost (but not quite) mechanically towards that which nourishes it and away from that which injures it, up to the lordliest beast of the field and forest, the scale of degrees rises in unbroken ascent.



But then follows a second break. Though purpose is inherent in plants and animals, it is still unconscious. Even in the highest animal it is so. The lion grows from the cub by some physical potentiality, but he has no conscious aim beyond that of self-improvement. He hunts down his prey with intent, but he is conscious of no end beyond the satisfaction of an immediate need. It is just here that man rises above the lion in degree, and by a step which breaks the continuity of the scale. He has not only consciousness (which the lion may or may not possess, according as you define the term), but also conscience. He distinguishes between right and wrong, suffers remorse for wrong, is aware of responsibility and of a moral growth to be attained by his own volition. He is conscious of himself as a purposeful agent, and with this intuition there appears in him a new element which, again in Aristotelian terms, is supernatural as distinct from the natural; and with this dualism there enters a new factor into revelation. From the inanimate and animate realms of nature, I *infer* a purposeful agent transcendent to the world by analogy with what I know of myself; though they themselves tell me nothing. But between man and man there is communication. Through language one man knows that his brothers have conscious purpose just as he himself has, and are drawing from it the same inference; and through this communication his faith in a larger purpose embracing all life seems to be authenticated.

From the clod of earth up to man we have thus an ascending ladder in the instruments of revelation, but with at least two gaps in the continuity which all the intense labour of evolutionary study, so intense as to be almost malignant, has not been able to abolish and shows not the slightest indication of ever being able to abolish.

Now there are three observations to make at this point. In the first place we do not directly perceive, or at least are not aware of directly perceiving, the creative purposing will behind the world; we only infer it. I know that I am a purposive responsible agent and from that intuitive knowledge I infer a purposive responsible agent, analogous to myself, behind the vast works of creation. In the Christian parlance the agent of the divine purpose is named the Logos, by whom, or through whom, all things were made that are made.

And secondly, it is to be remembered that, from the theistic point of view, the divine Logos is not *in* and *of* the world in the Stoic and pantheistic sense, but is transcendent. The Logos of God, if he speaks to us at all, does so not *from* the world, but *through* the world. He is in the world only as Shakespeare and Plato and Michelangelo may be said to be in



their works. We have in the visible phenomena about us what Gregory Nazianzen calls so superbly *theou ta opisthia hosa met' ekeinon ekeinou gnôrismata*, or, as the passage may be paraphrased: "God Himself we cannot know or see, but only His back parts and the indications of Him left behind." And this is true of man as well as of the lower creatures. Man has that which the rest of the (known) world has not: in his reason and conscience he possesses something analogous to the divine Logos and is thus capable of faith as the rest of the world is not. But, strictly speaking, his higher endowment should be called *to logistikon*, a logic faculty, rather than simply Logos. We may speak of being in God, but it is only by a loose and rather dangerous metaphor that we speak of God being in us. Our reason and conscience are not the immediate presence of God, but still are only the *gnôrismata* by which more clarity and cogency and precision are lent to the inference of faith. This distinction I take to be of the utmost importance.

And a third observation would be this. If the Logos denotes purpose in any way analogous to our human purpose, it follows that by the same principle of analogy we must think of God, however superhuman His power, as achieving His end through some obstacle or condition, or limitation. And this inference would seem to meet the facts of existence. I cannot believe that the law which conditions all life upon death, and which in the animal kingdom reveals itself in deliberate cruelty and conscious suffering, is the direct will of the Being to whom I attribute the joyous and beautiful aspects of creation. If my inference of a purposive Creator is coloured by my sense of order and beauty and righteousness; if, that is, it springs from the responsible and morally purposive side of my own nature, I must believe that God is good and wills good, and I must attribute the evil of the world to some other obscurely guessed factor that thwarts the full working of His will. Whether with Plato I should call this factor an aboriginal power of *ataktos kinêsis* or escape any positive definition by naming it *anankê*, whether I should call it the "matter" of Aristotle, or the ineluctable condition of individualism as the Stoics thought of it, or the "evil impulse" of the Hebrews, or an obtrusion into the world from the voluntary sin of pride as the Christians defined it—this I presume not to say. But everything about me, the very meaning of the word "purpose" as drawn from my own nature by intuition tells me that there is something in the sum of existence besides the will of God, and beyond that patent fact I deem it folly to conjecture.

So far we have considered revelation as it might be conceived and admitted by any theist; it shows degrees of clarity and



cogency, but from bottom to top it has its apparent initiation in the human faculty of inference. The question arises whether it has ever been anything more than this. In one way the question may be shelved by saying that the conception of revelation from without by the act of God and of revelation from within by human inference are not exclusive one of the other, since it may well be that the human faculty of inference is the means employed by God in revealing Himself through creation. But in the prophetic parts of the Old Testament I seem to catch hints of a more immediate operation of the Spirit of God upon the spirit of man, such indeed as I discern elsewhere among the great Gentile teachers of theism, but here in a manner so much less sporadic, so much more systematic, so much more organically related to the life of the people, so much more, as it were, forward-reaching, as to render the scripture of the Jews unique in the religious literature of the world. The very mark and seal of prophecy is the ever-present suggestion that the experience of Israel was preparatory to, and propædæutic of, a new form of revelation.

And such an event the Christian has always seen in the Incarnation. In the person of Jesus the orthodox believer has thought he could recognize the Logos, not manifesting itself indirectly as in the realm of nature from the dull clod of earth up to the most highly organized animal through the *gnôrismata* of a purpose behind creation, nor as more persuasively guessed from the conscious and supernatural reason of man, but as an immediate presence capable of self-expression. It is not that Jesus had merely a clearer consciousness of a divine element in his being, a completer comprehension of the relation of the *logistikón* of man to the Logos of God, but that the Logos actually abode in his human nature in such wise that besides being man he was God. How this union of the two natures could be, the Christian, if he be wise, does not presume to say; it is analogous to the dualism of the supernatural and the natural in man, but it is unique also in being the dualism of divinity and humanity; and this, and properly understood no more than this, the much castigated Definition of Nicea and Chalcedon, in its hard, precise, uncircumventible terms, would defend. Thus the revelation of God in Christ is analogous to the revelation through nature and man, but different in kind as well as in degree. In the New Testament we think we have a proclamation of love as the motive behind the purpose of creation directly and not by symbols and *gnôrismata* which we must disentangle from the disturbing signs of hatred; in the summons "Come unto me" we hear that which no prophet or son of a prophet would dare utter of himself, yet which seems to throw a sudden



illumination back over all the reaches of prophecy; and in the tragic end of the Incarnation we behold the thwarting of purpose, hitherto inferred from the remnant of cosmic disorder and from the cruelty of life, now carried up visibly to the purposive agent himself. Here is the last and terrible mystery of being. Before it we can only bow in awed humility. Reason does not grasp it; all our instincts cry out against it; but there it is. Somehow love, even the love of God, can effect its ultimate purpose only by paying the price of self-surrender and voluntary suffering. Everything of Christian faith I can find adumbrated in the other great theistic religions of the world, everything except this. Here, we have warrant to believe, something has been added to revelation which could not be reached by human inference; a truth, which might be guessed indeed from Deutero-Isaiah, has broken suddenly as a miraculous fact into the smooth current of history.

The clarity and cogency of revelation thus fall into a scale determined by the instrument through which it is made; and that scale is not continuous but interrupted at least at three points in the ascending passage from inanimate to animate nature, from animal to man, and from the dualism of man to the dualism of the incarnate Christ. But when we turn from the objective act of revelation to the subjective response in the human soul we see an ascent running parallel indeed to the scale of instruments, but different from that scale in being *continuous*. From the faith that accepts the inference of purpose in the clod of earth up and on to the faith that assents to the self-revelation of purpose in the Incarnate Word there is no break, no distinction in kind, but an unbroken ascent by degrees. Whatever the part of grace may be, and however it may operate differently through different channels, there is one corresponding act of faith, great faith or little faith, confused or clear, but still one faith.

And thus, if I am right, it is because certain theologians do not discriminate between these two parallel scales and do not see how there can be continuity on the one side and discontinuity on the other, yet are dimly aware of both continuity and discontinuity—it is for this reason that in the supreme act of revelation they confuse these two orders together, and speak of the Incarnation with a curious ambiguity as if it were something unique in kind, yet at the same time could be made easy to the rationalizing intelligence by explaining it as different only in degree from what we see in all men. In reality I would ask whether, in attempting to render the problem of Christology more acceptable to our understanding, they have not made it more irrational and incomprehensible.

PAUL ELMER MORE.



## MISCELLANEA

### NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE *Hibbert Journal* for January contains a striking article by Dr. Bevan entitled "Bishop Barnes on Science and Superstition." The article, which gains in weight from its studied moderation and courtesy, deals in particular with Dr. Barnes's oft-repeated assertion that beliefs which he dislikes are in conflict with Natural Science. Dr. Bevan points out with irresistible logic that whatever objections may be urged against these beliefs do not spring from Natural Science, which is irrelevant to them. The Bishop's arguments on these lines, he says, are of a piece with the astronomer's assertion that he could not believe in God, "because, having swept the heavens with his telescope, he had failed to find any trace of one."

Dr. Bevan proceeds, in the course of his article, to indicate the grounds on which the truth or falsehood of the beliefs in question—the belief in the Real Presence and in the efficacy of infant Baptism, in particular—should be judged. He names three: "(1) The effects, observable by spiritual sense, which actually follow alleged cases of the supernatural operation; (2) the recognition of an order of dignity or appropriateness in the relations of the spiritual, the mental, and the material which no belief must violate; and (3) the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of the authority." We must refer our readers to the article itself for the reasoning which leads Dr. Bevan to put forward these criteria, which deserve the most careful attention of theologians; and in the space of this note we cannot do more than suggest the lines on which we think that approach to them might prove profitable. With regard to (1), we believe that the fact that "child innocency is a thing almost confined to Christendom" (as we once heard a well-known missionary authority say) has a very definite bearing on the doctrine of infant Baptism. With regard to (2), it is significant that the Church has always insisted on the necessity of *faith* for the efficacy of the sacraments. And, with regard to (3), it is relevant to point out that the Anglican or Liberal Catholic conception of authority, with its emphasis on the appeal to reason and sound learning, seems to provide precisely the credentials which are needed.

The *Expository Times* for January contains an interesting article by Dr. Sydney Cave on "Brunner and the Moral Problems of our Time." It is impossible to give a summary of what is an already condensed account of Dr. Brunner's book *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* (The Command and the Ordinances). Suffice it to say that we have here a new and radical approach to Christian ethics, which roots the Christian moral life deep in the conviction and forgiveness of sin. We share Dr. Cave's hope that the book will find a translator.



## CORRESPONDENCE

SIR,

In the February number of THEOLOGY the Rev. K. D. Mackenzie gives expression to the doubt whether we can "be perfectly certain that without canonical authorization the 1928 service is valid." I suppose that by "canonical authorization" he means the passing of a canon formally authorizing the Book. But in this sense the 1661 Book never had any canonical authorization either. If we have been without a canonically authorized service for some centuries it seems a little late in the day to stagger at it now. Yet both the Books were revised and passed by Convocation. What more is needed?

Moreover, in arguing about the "moment of consecration" it seems to be too often forgotten that as there has been no divine revelation on the subject there can be no certainty about it. All that we can know for certain is that the consecration is granted in answer to the prayer of the Church, whatever that may be.

E. G. P. WYATT.

WHITE HOUSE,

RUSTINGTON.

LITTLEHAMPTON.

## STUDIES IN TEXTS

*Colossians* ii. 20-23.

The difficulty of this notorious passage has called forth such extensive comment that it would seem hardly credible that any fresh light could be thrown upon it. Yet I would suggest that a translation of the last clause of verse 23, which seems to be linguistically possible, attractive in sense, and yet to have been unnoticed hitherto, may offer a pleasing interpretation of the whole section.

But to deal with the difficulties in order:

1. *ἃ ἐστὶ πάντα εἰς φθορὰν τῇ ἀποχρήσει.*

The antecedent of *ἃ* is usually taken to be the implied object of the verbs *ἀψῆ*, etc. Thus Lightfoot paraphrases "You are attributing an inherent value to things that are fleeting," translating *τῇ ἀποχρήσει* as "in the consuming" (similarly Abbott in I.C.C.). This gives a good sense (cf. 1 Cor. vi. 12 and St. Matt. xv. 1-6). But the verb *ἀποχρῶμαι* (which is far commoner than the noun) is used at least equally often in the sense of "use too much" or "abuse" (cf. *καταχρῶμαι*, 1 Cor. vii. 31), and it is possible to take the noun in this sense here and follow Ambrose, Augustine, and many later commentators in taking the *δόγματα* as the antecedent of *ἃ*; "Which *δόγματα* by over-use (i.e., when too much stress is laid on such prohibitions) tend to destruction." Apparently *φθορὰν* must be taken to mean the spiritual destruction of those who submit to such injunctions. But I would like to suggest—though tentatively, since I can here adduce no authorities or parallel usages—that we might take the phrase as meaning "tend to self-destruction" (i.e., to defeat their object).

2. *ἅτινα ἐστὶ λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίας.*

*λόγον σοφίας* is usually taken in a disparaging sense. But this is based on the assumption that St. Paul must be condemning all ascetic injunctions *in toto*, which is not necessarily the case. There is certainly no *prima*



*facie* reason for translating λόγον σοφίας as "semblance of reason" (Lightfoot) or "show of reason" (R.V.) in view of 1 Cor. xii. 8, the only other instance of the phrase in St. Paul. "Rational basis," suggested but not adopted by Radford (West. Com.), would seem preferable; or, if it is felt that some irony must be intended, "apparent justification" (Radford) is surely as strong as the Greek will allow.

The same remarks apply to the interpretation of the words that follow: ἐθελοθρησκεία, ταπεινοφροσύνη ἀφειδία σώματος. There is no need to give them a derogatory sense. ἐθελοθρησκεία appears to be a coinage of St. Paul, and its meaning can only be gathered from similar compounds of ἐθελο in Classical Greek; there would appear to be no instances of such compounds in the κοινή. Such compounds seem sometimes to imply a bad sense—"self imposed" with the idea of "unnecessary" or "officious" (e.g., ἐθελοκινδύνης=foolhardy, ἐθελοδουλεία; Plato, Rep. 562 D), sometimes with a good or at least neutral sense (e.g., ἐθελοπρόξενος, Thuc. iii. 70). The use of similar compounds in *malam partem* in later Christian writers cannot be taken as an infallible guide to the meaning of St. Paul. ταπεινοφροσύνη, it is true, is used in a disparaging sense in Col. ii. 18. But in Col. iii. 18 and elsewhere it is regarded as a laudable quality.

### 3. οὐκ ἐν τιμῇ τινὶ πρὸς πλησμονὴν τῆς σαρκός.

These words present perhaps the greatest difficulty, and it is for these that I would suggest a translation which has apparently not been suggested before, and which I think helps to explain the meaning of the whole passage. There is no need to discuss the various interpretations which have been suggested. But it may be said that the translation of Lightfoot, "not really of any value to remedy indulgence of the flesh" (followed by R.V. "not of any value against," etc.), can hardly be justified on linguistic grounds. (1) τιμή apparently never means "objective value," only "price" or "valuation" (*vide* Grimm-Thayer, Moulton and Milligan *sub voc.*). To extract such a meaning by translating "not worthy of any honour" seems a trifle Procrustean. (This also rules out the solution favoured by, *inter alios*, Peake in E.G.T. of putting a comma after σώματος and regarding the clause as discontinuous—"not of any real value, but tending to gratify the carnal desires.")

(2) πρὸς by itself can hardly mean "against" (*vide* Abbott's convincing note in I.C.C.). In the κοινή it appears to be almost colourless; it "shares with εἰς the task of supplanting the disappearing dative" (Rademacher, N.T. Gr., p. 112).

Does not the clue to the difficulty lie in the fact that ἐν τιμῇ is parallel to ἐν ἐθελοθρησκείᾳ κ.τ.λ.? This will be clear if the sentence is read from ἀτινα to the end, disregarding the comma after σώματος. If this is so, all the words after λόγον ἔχοντα σοφίας qualify that phrase.

Two other considerations lead me to my conclusion. (1) τις may qualify an adjective (e.g., βραχύ τι, Acts xv. 34, etc.) or a noun (e.g., μέρος τι). By an extension of this use it may qualify a strong or a metaphorical statement—e.g., ἀπάρχην τίνα, Jas. i. 18, where it almost means "so to speak." (Possible parallels are Rom. i. 13, τινὰ καρπὸν; Heb. x. 27, φοβερά τις ἐκδοχή; and perhaps 1 Cor. vi. 11, ταῦτά τινες ἦτε.) (2) πρὸς is often used "of mental direction with words denoting desires or emotions of the mind" (Grimm-Thayer, *s.v.*)—e.g., with πίστις, 1 Thess. i. 8, etc. It may here be taken in this sense after τιμή.



Thus the passage may be roughly paraphrased: "If you died . . . why do you let yourselves be dogmatized with 'don't handle,' 'don't taste,' 'don't touch' ? Such injunctions defeat their own ends when employed to excess. For while they have a rational basis (or apparent justification) in being a voluntary form of worship, in the humility they engender, and in their mortification of the body, they have not such a rational basis in the honour—if I may so term it—which they pay to sensual gratifications."

St. Paul's meaning is, I submit, that asceticism defeats its own object when its negative side is overstressed (hence my proposed translation of *ἀπόχρησις*). By paying too much attention to the desires of the flesh it tends to their aggrandisement—thus paying them a "kind of honour"—by bringing into play the "law of reversed effort." This is sound psychology—as sound as that shown in Romans vii. St. Paul regards this as the obvious weak spot in the assertions of the Colossian ascetic teachers. Such practices are not even theoretically justifiable (*οὐκ ἔχοντα λόγον σοφίας*).

It will be seen that the interpretation of the last clause remains unaffected even if *ἐθελοθρησκεία* κ.τ.λ. must be given a disparaging, or at least an ironical, sense; nor is it essential that *ἀπόχρησις* should bear the meaning I would give it.

This interpretation seems to have the following merits:

(1) It does no violence to the Greek. (2) It allows St. Paul a smoother style in this passage than interpretations which would take the sentence as discontinuous. (3) The meaning would be readily understood by its hearers—a merit which can hardly be claimed for some interpretations of this and other difficult passages. This is surely in its favour; for the Corinthians, even St. Paul's opponents, admitted that his letters are weighty and strong, which implies that they found them also intelligible—unless they found them so impressive that, as the old lady said of the vicar's sermons, they "wouldn't presume to understand them."

H. S. BETTENSON.

## NOTES ON PERIODICALS

*Zeitschrift für die A.T.liche Wissenschaft.* 1932. Heft 4.

Two essays of outstanding importance appear in this number. (a) H. H. KRAUSE on "Amos the prophet of judgment, a forerunner of the Deuteronomist." Amos was a Judæan prophet sent by Yahweh to prophesy judgment on Israel, i.e. the Northern Kingdom, in the same way as Nahum prophesied against Assyria. Only ii. 4, 5, the woe against Judah, needs to be removed as a later addition in order to produce complete consistency. The conclusion, ix. 11-15, is a prophecy of the restoration of Judah, and of Israel under the house of David. The whole point of the book is condemnation of the illegal worship (and corrupt morals) of the Northern Kingdom. Only in Jerusalem can Yahweh be rightly worshipped. "The way of Beersheba" shows that pilgrimages to the South, which must have passed through Jerusalem, were an important factor in the life of the Northern Kingdom. iii. 2 is made to harmonize with ix. 7 by translating: "Have I known you only of all the families of the earth?"



(b) A. MENES writes on "Temple and Synagogue." A sanctuary always had a form of non-sacrificial worship—namely, the oracle. The first impulse towards a place of worship without sacrifice will have come from Josiah's suppression of sacrifice at local sanctuaries. The need was strongly felt among the Babylonian exiles, who set up sanctuaries, with altars not for sacrifice. This development, resented by the Jews in Palestine, is reflected in Joshua xxii. (a P section), where the tribes beyond Jordan declare that they have built an altar "not for burnt offering, nor for sacrifice" (v. 26). It is plainly attested in Ezek. xi. 16, where Yahweh declares He will be to them "a sanctuary in little" in the country of their exile. Ezekiel also forbids offering sacrifices at the sanctuaries of the exile; this must be reserved for Jerusalem (xx. 39 ff.). Now we can understand the exact descriptions of the sanctuary and its cult in Ezekiel and the Priestly Code. These show no interest in Solomon's Temple, and the Priestly Code is entirely concerned with the Tabernacle in the Wilderness. The exiled priests wrote these sections of P for the severely practical purposes of the sanctuaries of Babylonia. They went back to the wilderness, the prototype of their present exile; the Tabernacle, prefiguring the local sanctuaries, was the dwelling-place of Yahweh; so were the sanctuaries. The altar, etc., were exactly described, and the academic character of the whole of the Code is due to its being intended to be read aloud as a substitute for sacrificial worship. The reform of Ezra was the bringing to Judæa of the largely idealized sacrificial system of Babylonia, which had been cherished in exile as a system to be put into force the moment circumstances permitted. This is all very interesting, and gives us a far more probable picture than the usual one of synagogues opened in Babylonia for the purposes of prayer, while priests busied themselves with an antiquarian reconstruction of supposed arrangements in the wilderness. The whole of P was written for practical needs. Not a word, be it noted, is said about the centralization of cultus.

W. K. L. C.

*Zeitschrift für die N.T.liche Wissenschaft.* 1932. Heft 3/4.

A severely technical number, yielding little to the ordinary student. W. CASPARI examines and rejects a theory of Erbt's regarding a very early Gospel-source written in Hebrew. M. GOGUEL continues the discussion on the Trial of Jesus. The larger part of the number is taken up by patristics: the correspondence between Augustine and Jerome (DE BRUYNE); the pseudo-Cyprianic *De centesima*, etc. (H. KOCH), which is concluded to be dependent on Cyprian, and its supposed Irish origin to be unlikely; and the writing of Mark the Eremita on Baptism and the Messalians (E. PETERSON).

W. K. L. C.

*Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique.*

The January number opens with a careful examination of the double edition of the "De Unitate" of St. Cyprian by Father van den Eynde. He fixes the date of the second recension in 251. Father Mercier indulges in an elaborate account of the political theories of the Calvinists in the Low Countries during the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. This article, which runs to fifty pages, is, however, much more concerned with the effects of the theories than with the



theories themselves. The author rigidly confines himself to the writers of the past, and passes by the modern commentators upon the outcome of their work. Father de Aldama investigates the history of the anathema of the "Libellus in modum symboli" of Bishop Pastor. Father Gessler examines the catalogues of the libraries of the monasteries of Lobbes and of Stavelot. Father Lambert deals with the posthumous writings of V. M. Rafols. Father Maere analyzes new theories of art. His article and that of Father Mercier are a welcome change in the usual type of history we peruse in this important quarterly. The reviews and the accounts of the works published in the different parts of Europe attain a very high level of merit. This number also contains the lists of the articles published in the different learned periodicals throughout Europe, and of itself renders this quarterly indispensable to the serious student.

R. H. M.

*The International Review of Missions.* January, 1933.

This indispensable quarterly (i.e., for students of missionary problems) has broken fresh ground by including in its contents the first of four articles by Dr. J. H. Oldham, summarizing the contents of Professor Brunner's *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen*. This is a large volume in German of some seven hundred pages dealing with Christian ethics, and its author's name is sufficient guarantee of its importance. Students who do not read German will be glad of this summary until such time as an English translation makes its appearance. A shorter account by Dr. S. Cave will be found in the *Expository Times* for January, 1933.

S. P. T. PRIDEAUX.

*The Canadian Journal of Religious Thought.* Vol. ix., No. 4.

There must be many, not least the present reviewer, who read with regret the editor's statement that "we cannot go on any longer," and that therefore no more issues of the *Canadian Journal* will appear for the present. Two phrases in the statement suggest some hope of revival when better times come. One is "for the present," the other "in its present form." Perhaps, then, we may yet be able to welcome the return in some form or another of a religious publication marked by alertness to new thought and new knowledge, but also by sanity in dealing with it. Whatever the new form may be, and whenever it appears, we should hope for a continuance of the devout treatment of high themes so frequently to be found in past Editorials. An excellent example is provided in the number under review on The Challenge of the Incarnation. There is also a remarkably good article on the Oxford Group Movement in which the writer, who is Dean of the United Church College in Montreal, compares the work of the Group with that of the Christian Social Movement, suggesting that both are fruits of the Spirit, and that neither can say of the other "I have no need of thee." "In the New Testament teaching even the tongues of angels are not to be compared with the simple services of love. . . . The Holy Spirit is the spirit of wisdom unto common sense. And if it produces sudden and marvellous conversions it also ministers the common bread of God to common men and women for life's common tasks and the long, rough way when drudgery has to be made divine."

H. S. MARSHALL.



*Theologische Blätter.*

The January number contains an interesting correspondence between Professor K. Budde, Marburg, and Professor A. Lods, of the Protestant Faculty of Paris, on the interpretation of the Paradise story in Genesis, especially the meaning of the eating of the tree of knowledge. Professor Lods takes the view that the man and woman already knew that they were doing wrong before they ate, but that they acquired thereby intelligence, reason. He attributes to Professor Budde the view that he thinks that they first realized the distinction between moral good and evil. Professor Budde maintains his view to be correct.

There is another interesting article by Professor G. Stuhlfauth, of Berlin, on the maintenance of private confession and confessionals in Lutheran Churches, particularly in the Churches of Lübeck up to 1900, and in parts of Saxony and Silesia. It is pointed out that the form of the Evangelical confessionals differs essentially from those of the R.C. Church.

L. P.

*Jewish Quarterly Review.* Vol. xxiii., No. 3.

Professor E. A. Speiser writes on the Pronunciation of Hebrew as illustrated from the Hexapla. This is a continuation of his studies commenced in volume xvi. A guttural at the beginning of a syllable is left unexpressed by Origen—e.g., אָתָּא becomes *aath*, אֵינִי becomes *aeis*. After a vocal shewa the gutturals being ignored the shewa also is often not expressed—e.g., מִן becomes *μωδ*. A guttural closing a syllable is not represented (a) when it follows a *pathah*—e.g., בָּאֵה becomes *βare*; (b) when it follows a *hireq*—e.g., יֵהִי and יִהְיֶה become *iele*. But the presence of the guttural is indicated by the accompanying vowel—e.g., in the majority of syllables closed by a guttural, *ε* is used for the Hebrew short *i* and *a* sounds; thus the syllable is treated as closed, even though the consonant that closes it is not indicated. Of course the inadequacy of the Greek alphabet for transliterating Hebrew sounds makes Origen no certain guide in the attempt to arrive at the correct pronunciation of contemporary Hebrew. This Professor Speiser fully admits. His paper is worthy of careful reading.

Professor Mordecai Kaplan reviews Edmund Stein's *Philo und der Midrasch*. What contact did the Judaism of Alexandria in the third century, when the Torah was translated into Greek, have with Palestinian Judaism? Naturally an examination of the methods of Philo helps us in answering this question. Stein sees more common ground between these two schools of thought than actually existed between them. In his interpretation of Scripture Philo has frequent recourse to a system of allegory such as had already been applied by Greek philosophers to ancient mythology. Palestinian Midrash also employs the method of allegory. But there is this difference. The Jewish mind personified abstract qualities—e.g., when it pictures Falsehood as seeking to enter the ark; whereas Philo and the Alexandrians employed the reverse process, treating personalities as typified abstractions. When Philo used allegory he was influenced by Greek and not by Jewish lines of thought.

Hyman Klein contributes an article on the Rabbinic law of sale in which he concludes that it was conditioned by the Hadrianic persecution of the Jews.

R. D. MIDDLETON.



## REVIEWS

**THE BUDDHA AND THE CHRIST.** An Exploration of the Meaning of the Universe and of the Purpose of Human Life. The Bampton Lectures for 1932. By B. H. Streeter. Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 7s. 6d.

Having shown once again, in his first lecture, that science is incapable of providing a full interpretation of life, Dr. Streeter proceeds to explore the meaning of the universe and the purpose of human life with the aid of religion. And since, as he points out, "the religious history of man has flowed down two main streams, of which one has its spring in India, the other in Palestine," he suggests that it will suffice to examine "the two traditions which look back to the Buddha and the Christ." In the hands of so accomplished a scholar the treatment of such a subject is bound to be illuminating; and the book will no doubt attract considerable attention to itself in the East and in the West. The "friends in China and Japan" to whom the volume is dedicated will probably be pleased with it. It is a scholar's compliment to themselves and to their religion; and, if it goes against them on the whole, it yet contrives to say some very gratifying things, it passes no censorious judgments, and it modestly sets by the side of evolving Buddhism an evolving Christianity which may seem to them to be almost capable of being grafted on to it in the course of time and of helping to produce some new and better thing out of the union. Buddhism, we are told (p. 110), "is coming to life again—by being Christianized from within, and that spontaneously." Here surely is to be found encouragement for those who are working the change. From the Christian point of view the book will be variously regarded. Some readers will no doubt warmly approve the author's moderation in presenting the Christian Faith so inoffensively to the Eastern mind, and indeed to the "modern" Western mind; others will note with concern the incompleteness of the comparison by reason of the neglect of certain important elements of Christian doctrine and practice; while yet others will feel bound to complain that the central doctrine of the Incarnation never comes to its full Catholic expression on the author's part, and is never presented with the conviction which may be expected of a Christian preacher who takes it upon himself to treat of such a theme. Dr. Streeter has obviously been at great pains to acquaint himself with the doctrine and practice of Buddhism, and his learning and experience on the side of Christianity are in no doubt; but in spite of these things it must be said that there is in the book a far stronger



suggestion of the adventurer than of the scholar-priest who is a bond-servant to his Master.

At the outset the author explains that his lectures are "not, in their primary intention, a study in Comparative Religion. Rather, their aim is to explore the question whether—and if so, to what extent and in what way—materials afforded by such comparative study throw light on the character of the Unseen Power behind the Universe, and so can provide the basis of a working philosophy for everyday life" (p. ix). I should have thought that, except where the comparative study of religion is regarded as a department of sociology, that was its only conceivable purpose. The sociologist is free, of course, to treat the world's religions as nothing more than parts of the different cultures that men have built up, and to study them historically and comparatively in order to trace out their contacts and reactions and to note their differences and resemblances and, from the standpoint of social utility, to grade them as higher or lower. But the student who undertakes the comparative study of religion, as such, can never be content to examine religions as a scientist compares skeletons or leaves. Comparison is bound to be, for him, precisely what Dr. Streeter intends to make it—namely, a mode of enquiry as to the nature of the ultimate truth which those who profess the various religions are seeking. There is not the slightest necessity to suppose that these lectures exceed the proper limits of a comparative study of religion.

When, however, two religions are selected for comparison, not merely as to their history and form, but as to the value of their respective interpretations of the universe and of life, it is essential that each of them shall be presented fully and fairly, and that a rigorous examination of their agreements and contradictions and peculiarities shall be conducted to its issue. Here, it seems to me, Dr. Streeter fails. Forgetting the title he has given to the lectures, he sets, not the Christ, but the carpenter and poet-prophet Jesus, down by the side of the philosopher-prince Sakyamuni, sketches in the story of the development of the two religions which they founded, and then discourses generally on certain selected subjects in order it would appear to suggest, particularly to Buddhism, the true line of future development. In this last part there is a chapter on Pain in which the Buddhist solution to the problem is dismissed in little more than a page, the remainder being devoted to the solutions offered by Judaism and Christianity. In the lecture dealing with Action and Ideal, Buddhism proper does not figure at all, its place being taken by a brief treatment of the Confucian code. Only in the final lecture does Buddhism fairly emerge again, and then the available space is unnecessarily reduced by the introduction of a section on



psychical research. We are left at the close with a feeling that, while Buddhism has dropped into the second place, it has not been explicitly ruled out in any matter as a contradiction of the truth, and that while Christianity has taken first place, it has nowhere been suffered to appear in its full strength and glory.

These are times of bewilderment and great danger, when many suppose that all religions have failed because all are largely untrue. Eclecticism is the order of the day; and there is a hope in the hearts of some good men that out of the wreckage of the recent past a new ship may be built, on scientific lines, which will carry humanity safely on the bosom of the waters. That hope can be justified only if the religion of the Incarnation is man's supremest error. If, on the contrary, our Lord Jesus Christ is, as we believe, the Incarnate Son of God, we may patiently and profitably study the religious experience of others as that experience expresses itself in act and faith: but we can never allow ourselves to minimize and blur contradictions or to suppose that blends of the various creeds will carry us nearer to the truth than the creed we profess.

Dr. Streeter may be quite innocent of expecting or desiring such a fusion. But I believe that his book will offer some encouragement to those who do. The root fault of the position he has taken in these lectures is that he has seen fit to set the Christ over against the Buddha without due regard to the fact that the Christ is Himself the foundation of His Gospel. In the second lecture he plainly avows his intention: "The exact significance of the unique relation to God and man implied by the title Christ, or Son of God, is too large a question to discuss here. But it is worth while to explore the possibility of reaching, by reasonable conjecture, points of contrast or resemblance between the experience of Jesus and that of Sakyamuni, so far as this is not directly involved in the answer given to that question" (p. 61). To do this, however, is to destroy the value of the comparison for the avowed purpose of the lectures; for the experience and the world-view of Jesus are enlarged and authenticated by the fact that He is what He claimed to be. And if, in this book, He had been truly presented as Very God of Very God, it would have been necessary to proceed to set the sacramental life of His Body the Church by the side of the life of the Buddhist community, and so to provide additional valuable material for the exploration of the meaning of the universe and of the purpose of human life.

It is surely remarkable that the question of the Person of Jesus Christ is dealt with, not in the second lecture, where our Lord is set over against the Buddha, but in a later lecture which is entitled Magic, Philosophy, and Religion, as though it were a detachable problem and not a matter of central importance. It is, further,

surprising to find that in that lecture a parable is introduced (p. 179 f.) which suggests that we are all, as it were, sparks shot up from the furnace which is God, Christ being a larger spark "with a brightness like the morning star," and that then (on p. 186) we should be told that "to the Buddhist, man is a part of God, a tossed and troubled wave yet not other than the Ocean Itself." Is not such teaching bound to lead to serious confusion and error in the minds of Buddhists as to our belief concerning Christ and as to the possibility of their placing Him among their great ones as among His peers?

OSCAR HARDMAN.

A PLAINSONG HYMN-BOOK. Musical Edition. Edited for the Compilers of Hymns Ancient and Modern by Sydney H. Nicholson. William Clowes and Sons. 6s.

Through the enterprise of the committee of Hymns Ancient and Modern, those responsible for our Church Services have had a collection of hymns from which to draw ever since the first edition of Hymns Ancient and Modern appeared in the year 1861. And since that date the committee have added Appendices and Supplements, and have issued revised editions in the years 1868, 1875, 1889, 1904, 1905, 1909 (Historical Edition), 1916 and 1922.

In the earlier editions those tunes which were of primitive origin were treated in a somewhat "Anglican" way. Their harmonization and arrangement generally tended to a rigidity of rendering both words and music which, in the light of subsequent study, has been seen to be foreign to the character of plainsong.

An attempt was made, with a certain amount of success, to improve matters in this respect in the 1904 edition, when plainsong notation was introduced for the first time. This edition, however, for one reason or another, did not become generally popular, and the previous editions were not superseded by it. The later editions of 1916 and 1922 were, in fact, modelled upon the editions which appeared prior to 1904, so far as the treatment and printing of the plainsong tunes and the binding were concerned.

It is therefore all the more interesting that we should have before us a hymn-book published under the auspices of the proprietors of Hymns Ancient and Modern which is entirely devoted to ancient hymns with plainsong tunes. An historical "Preface" and instructive "Introductory Note to the Music" appear at the beginning of the book, and both merit notice in some detail. They deserve to be read and digested with care



by all who are interested in old hymns or who have the direction of hymn-singing in choirs and places where they sing, for there is not only history to be learned, but there is some first-rate advice to be found in regard to the singing of plainsong hymns which, indeed, might with advantage be applied to hymn-singing generally. There is great need in the present day to get away from that rigidity in hymn-singing which in psalm-singing is known as the "Anglican thump." We are reminded in the "Preface" that the interest and study which has been given to music of the Middle Ages "has made a notable contribution to the progress of the (musical) art as it is today." And one of the direct results of this study has been the bringing to light again of many liturgical hymns which had gradually given way before the great influx of hymns which were written to express Christian sentiment as opposed to Christian doctrine. It is true that translations of many of the old Office hymns have appeared in the hymn-books published during the last eighty years; and the inclusion of these has led to the general restoration of their liturgical use, which has been followed by a demand for "a more complete series than has hitherto been issued."

The ancient Latin series of Office hymns forms the main part of Part I. of the present volume; and these are set to the "proper" melodies to which they were sung throughout the greater part of western Europe in the early Middle Ages. With the translations from the old Latin series there are a few English hymns which were either worthy to be included with them or which filled a gap where there appeared to be no ancient hymn written.

Use has also been made of the later Latin hymns written for the French Breviaries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and a few sequences have also been included.

The second part of the book is devoted to hymns suited for use at the Holy Eucharist; while the third part contains hymns for processions and for other occasions not provided for elsewhere. The hymns in Parts II. and III. display a greater blending of old and new than is to be found in Part I.

The compilers claim that they have been actuated by a desire to produce not merely an historical and archæological book, but one "suitable and edifying"; and this has led them to curtail some of the longer hymns and to retranslate, in a few places with considerable freedom, the original Latin.

The ancient and traditional melodies of the Office hymns are often as old as the words themselves; but until the twelfth century these melodies were recorded by an elementary method of notation which could be little more than a reminder to those



who already knew them. When the system of staff notation was evolved, however, an accurate record was possible. The forms used in the present book are based upon the best English manuscripts of the thirteenth century.

The tunes of the Office hymns, belonging as they do to the period of real plain chant, have no definite time values; so that they cannot be represented in modern notation without tending to the hampering of the singers' freedom in performance. These melodies were also, of course, sung without any harmonic accompaniment, so that the addition of any accompaniment at all is, in a sense, an anachronism, tending further to endanger the free singing which is essential to the successful rendering of plainsong. The directions given under the heading of "The Method of Performance" are therefore worthy of the closest attention; the statement that a simple melody will "sing itself" is profoundly true, and it is equally true that "good reading sets the model to good singing." Singers, therefore, who would render plain chant well should adopt the following method: Firstly, read the words over until the correct verbal rhythm and freedom is acquired; secondly, monotone the words; and, thirdly, sing the words to the tune. The organ accompaniments must always be light, and must be played in such a way that the singers are given complete freedom, so that the words themselves determine the value of the individual notes of the tune. "The adding of any accompaniment in modern harmony is necessarily in some sense disrespectful to the melody. At best it imposes upon it a particular harmonic interpretation from which it is by nature free. At the worst it caricatures the tune by an alien interpretation." The harmonization of ancient melodies is always a question which bristles with controversy. Musicians who may be described as plainsong high-brows contend that the accompaniment of plainsong should be very simple and modal; while others are broader in the view they take. In the Plainsong Hymn-Book the task of adding accompaniments has been entrusted to no less than twenty musicians, and, considering the number, it is surprising to find a considerable amount of uniformity of treatment. Free use has been made of passing notes, accented and otherwise, and of suspensions, and here and there quite modern harmonies have resulted. Some of these will possibly shock the high-brows, and in some cases may even be thought to be out of keeping with the style of melody they are designed to support. Among these may be mentioned numbers 91 and 97; while in 142 the harmonies at the end of line one seem to be out of keeping with the harmonies used in the rest of the tune. The more modern and light treatments of verse two in numbers



29, 32, 44, etc., are quite successful, and provide an example to skilful accompanists of ways in which other tunes may be treated.

Among the most satisfying are 9, 41, 105, 109, 143 and 149, though it seems a pity that the opportunity has been missed in the last two named, *Dies iræ* and *Salve festa dies*, of providing varied harmonies for the different appearances of the tunes. This is all the more curious, as the encouragement of variety in accompaniment has been, in previous hymns, a feature of the musical treatment.

Taking the Plainsong Hymn-Book as a whole it is a welcome addition to the hymn-books which already exist; and the committee of Hymns Ancient and Modern have earned the gratitude of clergy and musicians alike in publishing a book which is, from cover to cover, full of fine hymns and fine tunes.

N. C. WOODS.

LITURGY AND WORSHIP. Edited by W. K. Lowther Clarke, D.D., with the assistance of Charles Harris, D.D. S.P.C.K., 1932. 15s.

After the Bible comes the Prayer Book: and the Literature Committee of E.C.U., in alliance with S.P.C.K., has followed up its Commentary on the Scriptures with a massive book on Worship. The moment is propitious. A considerable period of study by specialists has led, during these fifty years, to a steady demand for liturgical amendment and experiment. This in turn has brought about a wider diffusion of knowledge on the subject, and a less narrow outlook. The experiment has often outrun the knowledge; the outlook still remains very limited; but it is that situation which makes the appearance of this book specially opportune.

How far will it be able to meet the need? It is a bulky volume of 868 pages: it will not do for the pocket of a coat sacred to summer holidays. Much of it is rather heavy reading: it will not do for an armchair. Of course, it was not intended for such a fate as either of these.

What was the function that it was intended to fulfil?

A popular manual for the intelligent worshipper, such as France has provided in the volume called *Liturgia*, would have been very valuable, and commanded a large sale. But this is not a popular manual, at any rate in the sense that *Liturgia* is. It has no pictures: it does not popularize the results of modern liturgical science: it argues, and propounds views, and addresses the world of students.

It is not a book of reference, like the Prayer Book Dictionary, either in form or in method. It is not a Commentary on the



Prayer Book, in any general sense. It gives a good deal of historical commentary, and occasionally some practical comments: more rarely doctrinal comment; rarer still any real *rationale* of the services in question, or any exposition of the scanty rubrics that exist, or of the mass of customs—good, bad and indifferent—by which the rubrics must be supplemented; or any discussion of the principles on which such customs should be formed or reformed.

That is to say, that much which is sorely needed, and would be welcomed, is not to be expected here.

Perhaps, then, it can best be described as a "Miscellany," dealing in various ways with some topics which arise in connection with Anglican worship.

As such, it contains a great deal that is of solid value and present relevance. Also it is noticeable that the more important topics are those which are, generally speaking, best handled. Dr. Srawley writes with great competence an exposition of the English Order of Holy Communion. The early history is left to Dr. Gavin. Dr. Firminger discourses ably and fully about Ordination. The historical development of the English Prayer Book is treated in masterly fashion by Dr. Brightman, as readers of his *English Rite* would expect. In the short space of ten pages the Dean of Chichester gives an account not only of the rites but also of the history of the theories and practices concerning the disposal of the dead—a masterpiece of compression (*O si sic omnes!*). These are among the outstanding specimens of fine work, done with first-hand knowledge and with consequent authority.

In some respects, however, the editors have not been so well served. A composite book of this nature presents great difficulties to them. Is the book to be clearly laid out and to follow a certain plan? Then the needed contributors must be available. Or is it to contain those subjects about which people are ready to write? If so, what will eventually emerge is liable to be fortuitous—defective here and superfluous there. And the contributors, will they (if they will contribute at all) keep within the limits assigned to them, avoid overlapping, continue uniform with the agreed methods of the book and so on?

Indeed, it is an heroic task that these two editors undertook: and condolence rather than blame would be what it is fair to give them, in so far as the book falls short of being an entity, and is a "Miscellany."

Each of them has undertaken a good deal more than editorial work, and, in fact, figures as a prominent contributor: though one may suspect that two different motives, for the most part, moved their pens.



Dr. Lowther Clarke supplies the sections on the Calendar, the Lectionary, Holy Baptism, Confirmation, Matrimony, in the main body of the book, as well as a Preface at the beginning and four of the twelve Supplementary Essays that form Part III. He is happiest when, as in the case of Confirmation, he has behind him a recent full and authoritative study of the whole question:\* but all through his work is on a high level and fulfils admirably the requirements of the book.

Dr. Harris, as assistant editor, besides contributing two short studies to the Supplementary Essays, fills 144 pages of the central part with two long studies concerned with the sick—Visitation and Communion. In themselves these are very valuable: they would make a much-needed separate volume, or a pair of excellent Alcuin Club Tracts, on the basis of which a summary occupying some 40 pages of this book would have been adequate for its purposes.

We are thus brought to a consideration of the question, What is the future of this book? Undoubtedly it should be widely read at the present time: but in its present form it lacks the qualities which would ensure to it lasting value. Yet it will be a disaster if large parts of its contents pass out of use: they need to be rescued and given a chance of permanence.

There is a good deal that it is useful to have on record, but unnecessary to have always at hand: valuable to students, but not to average candidates for ordination, still less to average worshippers.

There is a good deal of overlapping and even contradiction. This is inevitable in the book as it comes out today; but it should be overcome, or at least diminished, in any future edition or reconstruction which is to last.

Besides, as has been hinted above, there are *desiderata*. It is strange to deal with liturgy, but pay no heed to the fabric and ornaments of the place of worship, to the ceremonial, or the music, and other topics which are prominent (even unduly so) in the minds of worshippers.

Again, if these needs are to be met, the practical exposition of the services must be strengthened. We have a "liturgical movement" going on among us in England, not quite the same as that which is going on abroad, and to so great advantage, but comparable to it, and equally needing good literature to foster and develop it. It is largely for lack of such guidance that so many English churchfolk still feel so lost and uncertain what to do at Holy Communion, particularly when they are not receiving, or else have communicated at an earlier service.

Great words and ideas of the service are not understood, even

\* *Confirmation*. 2 vols. S.P.C.K., 1926.



when prominent in the rite. Why "mysteries"? why "sacrifice"? why priest and altar? or else, why not? What is adoration? and, in fact, where do such ideas as these find their place in our services? Mr. Brabant's comment on Otto does not meet the case: Guardini would have been a better text; but why not the service itself? Where this has been done it is very welcome, and will be helpful.

On the other hand the student, too, requires more consideration. Some writers assume that he will not want to be bothered by references or footnotes: others assume that he will. Some satisfy this kind of curiosity, in some places, by giving such notes: and tantalize it elsewhere by withholding them. There is much to be said for either assumption: but if the reader is not to have them on the page, he should be given somewhere a bibliographical note for his guidance or reassurance, such as is given here in half a dozen places and no more.

But apart from this a few pages devoted to a very select bibliography of the literature of the subject are needed. Indeed, without such help a number of the references given are not intelligible, unless the reader is already rather well read in the subject. If such a list were made out it would soon appear that some of the best sources of information have been little, if at all, utilized or cited. Is there a reference anywhere (for example) to the great French Dictionary of Archæology and Liturgy, to say nothing of the great schools of German and Italian Catholic writers, who are now doing a great deal of the best liturgical work?

These are not carping criticisms: they are made in the interest of the book, and of its future; and in the belief that it carries us a good way on towards a future volume which may become a classic of general and lasting value.

WALTERUS TRURON.

---

## NOTICES

**LENT: A MANUAL FOR THE CLERGY. S.P.C.K. 4s.**

Although, as the sub-title indicates, this book is intended to help the clergy in their Lent work in the parishes, there is much in it which the layman will find of great value if he chooses to use it as his special book of devotional reading during the forty days. Rather more than half of it is devoted to sermon outlines and suggestions, chiefly drawn from the Sunday Epistles, Gospels, and the Lessons as provided in the 1922 Lectionary; the rest of it is made up of four short essays: On Fasting, by Father Tribe, S.S.M.; on Modern Methods of presenting the Doctrine of the Atonement, by Dr.



Grensted; on Anglican Adaptations of Latin Rites and Ceremonies, by K. D. Mackenzie; and on Lent Reading, by Dr. Eck.

The sermon outlines might well be used as aids to meditation day by day, and the layman seeking for a manual which shall guide his meditations and base all his thoughts on Holy Scripture will find here much practical wisdom. Too often it happens that books specially written for Lent use are so complete in themselves as to make further meditation on the theme provided almost impossible; and they take the place of meditation on the Bible itself, to the great loss of those who use them. It will be necessary for anyone who wishes to use these outlines to have his Bible open before him as he reads; if he does so he may well have learnt by the end of Lent to rely more upon Scripture itself for this exercise than upon devotional reading which demands less effort on his part, and is often rewarded with fruit of less permanent value.

The essays on Fasting and the Atonement are of supreme value, though most tantalizingly short; both of them deal with their subject with a refreshing understanding of the revolt of the modern mind against much that is traditional in Christian practice and thought, while they emphasize man's need of discipline no less than of the atoning work of God made Man.

Fr. Tribe treats of Fasting under five main headings; passing on from the thought of it as a discipline, or an act of reparation and penance, he considers its psychological value, its part in the building up of a habit of Christian obedience, and the importance of prayer as its invariable complement. Where there is so much that is valuable, selections for quotation are difficult to make; but one or two may serve to show how excellent is his treatment of the subject: "Fasts of devotion undertaken simply out of love for God have this advantage. They strengthen the devotion by giving it expression. It is a well-known fact that an emotion or a sentiment such as this, if it does not find its outlet in expression, is likely to die away, or even to cause disturbance in the subconscious self. There are more people suffering from repressed religion than from sex repression." And one more: "We are rightly frightened of the idea of the omnicompetent state in political action, or of Cæsarean bureaucracy in religion; but if there is one need in English religion at the moment, it is the need for corporate thinking and feeling. Therefore corporate action in a matter like fasting would be a most valuable corrective to the disruptive tendencies of modern individualism."

"In living experience and in theological theory, it is the fact of sin which makes an atonement necessary, if the purposes of God are not to fail. The newer evangelism to which we are called need ask no other starting-point."

"Men today are impatient when we speak to them of sin, because they believe often enough that the clergy still cling to these old rigid conceptions. And that being so, we must speak to them of sin not less but more. But we must speak to them in a new and more living way, with no less gravity, but with a wider sympathy." This extract from Dr. Grensted's article on "Modern Methods of Presenting the Doctrine of the Atonement" gives a clue to his general line of approach to the problem. In the light of present-day humanism few subjects are so difficult for the preacher as that of Calvary and its message for the modern world. Dr. Grensted deals with great clarity with some of the theories of the Atonement which have held the field of speculation from time to time, but he is not content to deal with the problem only on its historical side. He shows how, whatever may be



the difficulties in thought which lie behind the mystery of redemption, the forces of cosmic evil are seen to be weak when set against the unresisting strength of Christ.

This book is extremely well worth reading; in its freshness and its alert attention to modern problems it never loses sight of the deep things which lie behind sin and redemption, repentance and reconciliation; its use should stimulate many to keep a better Lent, and so come to a happier Easter.

DUNCAN ARMYTAGE.

STUDIES IN THE MINISTRY OF OUR LORD (first series). By H. F. B. Mackay. The Centenary Press. 7s. 6d.

This is an Anglican "Papini," exquisitely designed and executed. No one else approaches Father Mackay's literary skill in this *genre*; everything is so exactly right. The Gospel story lives and glows with colour. A reviewer anywhere else than in an austere theological journal would be content to offer his humble meed of praise and recommend everyone to buy the book. But in these columns we try to be critical, so that it will not seem ungracious if we point out some passages in which the gifted author adds interpretations, which for all their charm are not taken from the Gospels.

"The Holy Family possessed a complete Hebrew Old Testament" (p. 17)—ever so many rolls, presumably, stored in a great chest. This is improbable. A class of learned men was needed to interpret Scriptures written in a tongue nearly as different from Aramaic as Anglo-Saxon is from English. St. Peter had eyes "just like the eyes of the very nicest dog in the world"; he was "like a large and very nice dog" (p. 43). The disciples came to Jesus at Jacob's well with "eggs and fruit" (p. 90). "*When We Were Very Young* would have been one of His favourite books" (p. 101). All twelve Apostles were "lower middle-class business men" (p. 143). How does Preb. Mackay know all this? He has a really exciting description of Jerusalem, which had its Debenhams, Selfridges, and Mappin and Webb, its postal service and parcels post, its newspapers, even Sabbath editions of them, its ladies with vanity bags containing mirrors. I have recently read Billerbeck's five volumes, G. F. Moore's two, and works of G. Kittel and J. Jeremias, all of which describe Judaism, including Jerusalem, in the time of Christ. I missed these bits, no doubt through my own inattention; so my regret that Father Mackay gives no references is intensified.

Nearly every one who reads this book will be edified, but there are sufficient people in the world to whom accurate history, so far as it can be reconstructed, is of paramount importance to justify sounding a note of caution about those to whom it can wisely be lent.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

THE HISTORY AND LITURGY OF THE SACRAMENTS. A. W. Villien. English translation by H. W. Edwards. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 8s. 6d.

This is a history of the rites of the *Rituale*. It is not a history of the Sacraments as such, nor of the Eucharistic liturgy. Professor Villien



has, in fact, done for the Ritual what Adrian Fortescue did for the Missal. It need hardly be said that the work is packed with learning, and illuminates the whole subject. The author is specially interested in drawing attention to the light thrown on obscure points in the modern Ritual by the consideration of its history. Thus the minute ceremony of the exchange of a violet stole for a white one in the middle of the rite of Baptism is made to conjure up the picture of a multitude of priests, deacons, and acolytes all changing into white garments and themselves entering barefoot into the font, while the Pope enquires the name of each candidate and interrogates him with clauses of the baptismal creed. So even the very simple ritual of Penance is a shadow of the solemn ceremonies of the ancient public discipline. The great difference is in the order of its component parts; but Professor Villien tells us that even as late as the first half of the nineteenth century it was quite a frequent practice for the priest to defer Absolution until some satisfaction had actually been made. On the subject of Confirmation he seems a little misleading. On p. 68 he states that prayer and imposition of hands are the only outward part of the sacrament mentioned by ecclesiastical writers for three centuries, and that there is no mention of unction with chrism until the fourth century. Yet on p. 70 he himself quotes the description of Confirmation in the *Apostolic Tradition* of the beginning of the third century which includes Unction with oil as well as imposition of hands. But he does not mention the immense stress which Tertullian lays on the necessity of Unction, nor the fact that it is mentioned by St. Cyprian, nor Origen's use of the phrase *unctio chrismatis* (see Maclean in *Confirmation*, S.P.C.K.). Under the heading of Extreme Unction the assertion that in the earliest centuries (i.e., apparently down to the seventh century) the oil of the sick "*perhaps . . .* was not so strictly reserved for the unction of the dying" seems to be an under-statement. It is interesting to notice that the author states quite unequivocally that the elevation of the subdiaconate to the rank of a Major Order is purely ecclesiastical, and that liturgically it is still of Minor rank. The book concludes with a very full account of the variations in the age for First Communion at different periods of the history of the Church. It appears that the deferring of First Communion until years of discretion are reached was the result of teaching, which was a novelty in the thirteenth century, that Holy Communion is not strictly necessary to salvation, and requires faith and piety for due reception. Under the influence of this teaching the age was increased, and the decree of 1908 defining "years of discretion" as equivalent to "the age of reason" (i.e., seven years) was a compromise between the primitive Communion of infants and the modern practice of making First Communion the climax of a long period of instruction. All this is of special importance in France with its traditions (possibly traceable to St. Vincent de Paul) of solemn ceremonies in connection with First Communion.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

GOLD CORD: THE STORY OF A FELLOWSHIP. By Amy Carmichael.  
S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.

To my very great loss, I had not so much as heard of Dohnavur until I came to read this amazing book. And "amazing" is altogether the wrong word, though it comes naturally enough to the reader's mind. For a Christian should not be amazed at things like this. It is just the



natural and free life of the Spirit, lived in all simplicity and beauty and direct faith in God.

Miss Carmichael tells the story of the work in this Indian village with the directness, and with something of the inconsequence, of a poet and a visionary. She makes us see, without telling us too openly, the terrible need of those "temple children" of which India herself dare hardly admit the existence, and in whose service the Dohnavur fellowship came into being. She shows us the continuing work of the Spirit in direct and simple guidance, and in a courage which is prepared to believe absolutely that where the way of God is clear, God will provide. Some of us were a little frightened by *Mother India*, and not altogether surprised that it provoked something of a storm. But this peaceful, radiant record of a very home of the saints throws an even more searching beam upon the terrible walled temples of Southern India, and the tragedy of an ancient civilization which hates the evil in its midst, and yet does not hate or heed enough to act.

It is more than interesting to one in close touch with the Oxford Group to see the same simplicity of guidance and of courage in surrender worked out in this peaceful serenity of loving service. Nor, indeed, is there any need to make comparisons between the two, since the Group has, in fact, come to Dohnavur, and found itself at home. If there be a difference it is a difference due to the very different conditions under which the warfare of the two Fellowships is carried on. But if one of those who has travelled with the Oxford Group in many lands could choose a place where he might stay a while from his wandering, I think it might well be that he would choose Dohnavur first of all, among the saints, and the children.

I gather that Miss Carmichael has written other books. I must read those too.

L. W. GRENSTED.

A WORD-BOOK OF METAPHYSICS. By F. W. Felkin, M.A. Oxford University Press. 3s. 6d.

Here we have a quite clear and consistent exposition of a Christian metaphysics. Its form—that of a "Word Book" in which the terms (*e.g.*, entelechy, dualism, immanence) are defined one by one in order—makes for clarity, and the writer is enabled to build up his system step by step, and the reader can see what he is at. It would seem that a Platonic monism makes it possible for certain "ultimate facts" (*e.g.*, the identity of mind and matter, and might and right, the non-existence of positive evil, and the duty of self-aggrandizement) to be held as facts, but as not generally applicable to human conditions. In short, a doctrine of eternal spirit differentiated in what we call Time and Matter and still remaining Itself solves all paradoxes for the philosopher. Only he must have faith.

W. J. FERRAR.

MENSCH UND MESSIAS. 7 M. PHILIPPER 2. 4 M. By E. Barnikol. Walter G. Mühlau Verlag, Kiel.

With every wish to do justice to original thought, one cannot commend these lucid and laborious essays, which exemplify a typically German *Entweder . . . Oder* attitude of mind. The thesis is that St. Paul knew



nothing of any pre-existence of Christ. The passages in 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Philippians which point to such a belief are laboriously explained away, or dismissed as Marcionite insertions. The other Epistles are not "Paul's," but "Pauline," deutero-Pauline, or trito-Pauline, so their evidence is not here considered. Now it is highly improbable that a conception, which is clear as daylight in the assumed followers of St. Paul and in the Fourth Gospel, was not present to the master mind of the Apostolic Church. The Wisdom-teaching of Proverbs viii., Philo's Logos doctrine, and the general Jewish ideas of pre-existence, are sufficient to prove the existence of a complex of ideas which a theologian like St. Paul must have considered in relation to his newly won belief in Jesus Christ as Lord of all. Dr. Barnikol's attempt to reconstruct St. Peter's doctrine of Christ from that of the Ebionites, and his argument that no one accused St. Paul of deviating from St. Peter in Christology, and so St. Paul's theology was Ebionite too, are, to express it gently, an undue simplification of the problem.

None the less, we are grateful to him for valiantly tackling a problem of supreme importance and, by his failure (as we consider it) to shake the generally held position, strengthening our faith.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

ON THE POWER OF GOD (QUÆSTIONES DISPUTATÆ DE POTENTIA DEI).  
First Book (Quæst. I.-III.). By Saint Thomas Aquinas. Literally translated by the English Dominican Fathers. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 7s. 6d.

The Dominican translator of the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa contra Gentiles* (whose name is now disclosed) has put students of St. Thomas still further in his debt by this book. The *De Potentia* is (as the Preface explains) an account, edited by St. Thomas, of disputations held by him regularly during term; in his first three years at Paris he held these twice a week. At these regular discussions the subject was proposed by the Professor and turned inside out in a morning's discussion; at the next meeting the Professor set out in order the difficulties (objections) which had been raised, with authorities (*sed contra*) which gave useful guidance; then he gave his own reasoned exposition of the subject, and finally his replies to the difficulties. These disputations can thus be regarded as preparatory studies for the treatment of the same themes in the *Summa Theologica*; naturally therefore they form an admirable commentary upon it.

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

ST. AUGUSTINE. By Karl Adam. Translated by Dom Justin McCann. Sheed and Ward. 1932. 2s. 6d.

The readers of the *Confessions of St. Augustine* must be legion. Yet comparatively few can have had the opportunity to grasp the real breadth of his religious experience. This is now possible through the admirable translation of Dr. Adam's lecture delivered at the celebrations of the Augustinian centenary at Tübingen two years ago. Dr. Karl Adam's name has already become familiar to English readers through the publication of his *Spirit of Catholicism*. We are indebted to Dom Justin McCann for this further introduction to his work.

Of all the patristic writers Augustine has a special interest for the pres-



ent day just because he was, as the author reminds us, "as few have been, a seeker for the truth." Especially is his witness to the place of the Church needed in an age dominated by individualism in religion. "According to Augustine's mind the true Christian is never alone, never solitary." To him schism is a sin, just because it is an outrage on "social love." We may well agree with the author when he tells us that there is a sore need of a revival of a "Christianity such as Augustine taught . . . a living faith in the essential union of all Christians with one another and with Christ their head." It is to the satisfaction of this need that all labours and prayers for the Reunion of Christendom are directed.

TREVOR JALLAND.

JESUS AND HIS APOSTLES. By Felix Klein. Translated by W. P. Baines. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

Recent years have seen the production of a number of popular *Lives of Christ*, of which the works of Paterson-Smyth from the Anglican and Papini from the Roman Catholic side are examples. The danger about certain types of biographical writing is that the author's enthusiasm may carry him off into flights of rhetorical and dramatic exaggeration to such an extent as to diminish the reality of the portrait he aims to paint. Such is not a defect of the present book. Its defects, if there are any, chiefly arise from the fact that the author ignores or is unaware of the problems raised by modern New Testament study. As a result he tends to treat the discourses in St. Matthew as actual sermons, and not, as most of us believe them to be, collections of teaching on cognate subjects arranged by the author for the benefit of his readers. In fact, the average Anglican reader would perhaps expect to find more attention paid to the record of St. Mark. No doubt this would have involved difficulties which the author avoids, but it is St. Mark's account, not St. Matthew's, which justifies the treatment given to the "Little Apocalypse," on page 273. And it is only the text of the Vulgate which saves him the problem of discussing the limitations of our Lord's human knowledge. But it is only fair to say that this book is not concerned with criticism or controversy; it aims at describing a familiar story, and, to quote from the preface contributed by the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris, produces an impression "de vie, de fraîcheur, de sincérité."

TREVOR JALLAND.

A HISTORY OF MANCHESTER COLLEGE. By V. D. Davis, B.A. Allen and Unwin. 10s.

When Manchester College was founded in 1786, Dr. Barnes, the first Principal, delivered an address in the course of which he said, "You are erecting a Temple, on the front of which you will inscribe no name of any distinguished human leader, either in science or theology. You will dedicate it 'to Truth! to Liberty! to Religion!'" In 1893 the buildings of Manchester College, Oxford, were opened and the inscription over the entrance was taken from this dedication.

In the history of this offspring of the early religious academies the story is traced through periods when the college was located in Manchester, in York, again in Manchester, in London whose new University imposed no religious tests, and finally in Oxford.



The necessity for separate schools and colleges for Dissenters and Nonconformists arose between the years 1662 and 1670, and Mr. Davis places Manchester College in direct descent from the Warrington Academy, which he considers to be sixth in order from Rathmel where, he suggests, the first of these institutions began. We are inclined to think that many would claim Sheriffhales, Newington Green and Carmarthen as still earlier foundations, dating from 1663, 1666 and 1668 respectively, but a good case is made out for the ancestry of Manchester College through the famous Warrington Academy.

In a lucid but sufficiently detailed account we are reminded of many great names associated with the institution, either as students or tutors, or sometimes as both. These include Charles Wellbeloved, James Martineau, John Estlin Carpenter and, not least, Dr. L. P. Jacks. The book contains some interesting vignettes of personalities like these.

Estlin Carpenter's picture of James Martineau is typical. "We knew that we were confronted by a great personality. His never-failing punctuality, his dignity of manner, the noble lines stamped clear upon his face, the deep tones of his voice, even the 'sumptuous simplicity of his little apparatus'—the morocco portfolio, the large page of MS. unspoiled by correction or erasure, the ivory paper-knife and (in cold weather) the almost regal robe of fur-lined purple cloth—all these seemed but the external harmony of the inner greatness which gesture and words alike conveyed."

The college became famous as a post-graduate School of Theology where men were trained for a religious ministry on the principle of undogmatic freedom. Indeed, the conditions of the foundation were so "liberal" as to forbid any test or confession of faith. The story of the development of this scheme provides an interesting chapter in the progress of religious education, in which it is not possible to classify it as an example of Unitarianism only, for one finds men in Anglican orders serving, on occasion, upon its staff.

To those who are desirous of tracing the incidence of the Test Acts on subsequent religious history, this book will suggest some useful fields to be explored.

LESLIE F. CHURCH.

**APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY.** By the Rev. C. R. Vassall-Phillips, C.S.S.R.  
Burns Oates and Washbourne. 8s. 6d.

While the author expresses the hope that his book will be of value to members of his own Communion, he does not conceal the fact that he is writing with an eye on the Anglican or Protestant reader. Few Anglicans would disagree with his contention that the central proposition of Apostolic Christianity is that Christ is God. But most of them would hesitate to follow him, when he goes on to argue the additional proposition that Apostolic Christianity is Papal Christianity.

The author presents his case attractively, and perhaps to the unwary reader convincingly. But all along there lies the assumption that Roman Catholicism alone has succeeded in preserving Apostolic Truth (which is, after all, the hypothesis which he sets out to prove). As a result we come across occasional generalizations like that on page 197: "How few, comparatively speaking, believe in the Trinity in England, unless they are Catholics," or on page 391, "Only the old people have any care



or use for church or chapel. Protestantism has lost the hold it once had upon the young." Would the average Roman Catholic parish priest agree that he experiences no difficulty in holding the adolescent?

Probably we find him least satisfactory when he comes to treat of the relation of St. Peter to the rest of the Apostles, and to the Council of Jerusalem. The author suggests that St. James only spoke, as it were, by accident. St. Peter having defined the answer, further discussion was unnecessary. Perhaps he is ignoring the fact that according to conciliar procedure in the ancient world, it is the senior who speaks last. But those who desire a reasoned defence of the Godhead of Christ will be grateful for this book.

TREVOR JALLAND.

**BOLSHEVISM.** Theory and Practice. By Waldamar Gurian (translated by E. I. Walkin). Sheed and Ward. 10s. 6d.

That Bolshevism is no merely temporary experiment in government and no merely Russian political phenomenon is long ere this apparent. Not only is it firmly planted over a sixth of the world's surface, but it claims and ceaselessly seeks to vindicate the claim to represent a new order of society and human life, of which Russia presents only the first and most conspicuous example. It has its advocates, its groups and parties, in every land, European and Asiatic, and, however far peculiarly Russian in its historical rise and establishment, it is universal and world-wide in its principles and its propaganda. Moreover, it has behind it a clearly thought out philosophy, a single idea which inspires and informs all its varied expressions, an idea too which is never allowed to remain in the air, but is, so far as it is true to itself, bound up with action, constant, thorough and relentless, and with the unceasing and devoted effort to translate it into practice. Hence the need for Western society, and not least for the Church, of taking account of this vast movement and of the theory which underlies it, and of meeting it not with ignorant recrimination, but with understanding, with a theory of life more profound and more true, and with action equally devoted and equally single-minded.

Hence the value of this book, which, while critical of Bolshevism and its conception of human nature, yet endeavours to point out that in its rise and its astonishing success it is the outcome of a particular set of historical conditions and answers to a deeply felt human need. The historical conditions were those of the revolutionary movement in Russia, which, varying in the classes represented in it, the aims they sought, and the methods they pursued, had gathered increasing impetus and weight throughout the latter half of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth centuries, but yet awaited a political crisis of the first order as the occasion of overthrowing the old and establishing the new government, a political crisis eventually found in the breakdown of the Czarist administration under the strain of the Great War. The deeply felt human need, to which Bolshevism appeals and which it claims to supply, is that felt not only within but without Russia by those who find themselves outcasts from bourgeois society and the existing industrial system, and turn in desperation and hope to those who claim the ability to build a new world on the ruins of the old.

The failure of the Provisional Government under Kerensky's leadership, which followed the downfall of the Czar in the spring of 1917, to meet the needs of the hour is clearly brought out. It was a government of com-



promise and indecision, an attempt to combine the new order with features inherited from the old, to establish a representative democracy on the model of Western Europe, and it was something far more uncompromising and thoroughgoing than the times called for. The man of the hour proved to be not the vacillating Kerensky, but Lenin, returned from exile steeped in Marxian philosophy and endowed with a genius for establishing in the face of stupendous difficulty a wholly new political and social order based on Marxian principles. The idea worked out in literary shape by Karl Marx and pervading the Bolshevik system, as established and maintained by Lenin, is that man lives by bread alone, that he is an economic animal, and that the inevitable outcome of human history is the establishment of an order of society in which economic needs form the paramount, indeed the sole consideration. Such an order of society is one in which classes and class interests, indeed all interests but one, are repressed, and emerges in a dictatorship of the Proletariat, government by and for the industrial masses.

Such was the ideal with which Lenin set out, and such that which, with whatever compromises necessitated by existing conditions, has been consistently pursued by him and his successors. In practice the outcome has been not "all power to the Soviets" as proclaimed, but all power to the Bolshevik party, the narrow oligarchy which, accepting for itself the Marxian philosophy of society, has in pursuit of its ends imposed an iron discipline not only on the nation as a whole but on its own members. Both in theory and practice nothing must withstand the all-embracing authority of the absolute state, the interests of which are the sole determinant of all institutions, all activities and all values. It involves State Socialism, the public ownership and control of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the Five Year Plan is nothing but a gigantic and well-directed constructive attempt to carry this into effect. It involves a direct attack on the family and on marriage, as institutions inimical to the absolute state. It involves the persecution and eventual elimination of all forms of religion, as representing a realm of spiritual values which for Bolshevik theory are non-existent and as supporting the old bourgeois order of society. Not least it involves the employment of ruthless methods of terrorism, of sheer naked force, for the crushing of all opposition, supposed or real, in belief or practice, and for the securing of the sole dominance of the socialist state.

Such is Bolshevism pursued with a single-minded zeal which amounts to religious fervour, and seeking to make Russia but the seed plot of a world revolution. And as such it claims above all to be understood, and to be confronted not with a defensive barrier of vested interests, but with a theory and a philosophy of life more true and more complete than that of Bolshevism, and lived and pursued with equal devotion. Hence the need of thinking out afresh under modern conditions the Christian conception of society and human life, and of applying it over the whole range of human interest and activity. This book, which concludes with a number of documents quoted in part or in full, can be strongly recommended as a preliminary study of the greatest attempt which history has seen to destroy all that is of spiritual worth and to erect an order of human society bounded wholly by the needs and interests of the visible order.

P. A. MICKLEM.



THE SCHOOL OF JESUS CHRIST. By Père Jean Nicolas Grou, S.J. Translated by Mrs. Rodolph Stawell with an introduction by Dom Roger Hudleston. Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd. 10s. 6d.

More than one of the spiritual writings of Père Grou are already known to English readers; perhaps the best known are the *Spiritual Maxims* (1789) and the *Interior Life of the Soul* (published posthumously 1833). Those who are already acquainted with these will not find anything intrinsically fresh in the volume (written c. 1800) which now appears for the first time in an English translation. Nevertheless, whether for those who do not yet know the helpfulness of Grou or for those who would make further proof of it, this book is well worth having and will furnish good spiritual food for many months. The school of Jesus Christ is concerned with the learning of such things as the call of our Lord to learn the way of Penitence, the experience and practice of the Love of God, the Nature of Christian righteousness, and the Way of carrying the Cross. Here is no mere treatise on ascetic theology, but a real teaching in plain and practical terms of those things of which the author says in his preface: "We boast that we are the disciples of Jesus Christ. But are we really so? Very few know the things they need to know if they are to become Christians."

A. R. BROWNE-WILKINSON.

L'ORIENT ET NOUS. By Leopold Levaux. E. Desbarax, Louvain. 25 frs.

Of the four essays in this book the first is the most interesting. In a brief sketch of Roman Catholic missions in China from 1242 and their revival under Matteo Ricci in 1578, he points out that, though converts were fairly numerous, there was after a hundred years no native priest. In 1658 a Société de Missions Étrangères was founded with the object of building up indigenous churches. Only one Chinese bishop, Mgr. Louo-wen-tsao, was consecrated. He, however, succeeded marvellously in holding the Church together when missionaries were expelled. On their return the movement for a native clergy was largely dropped, and missions merely marked time. Then, in 1900, Père Lebbe arrived, and the consecration of six Chinese bishops in 1926 was largely due to his labours for a truly indigenous Church.

Then follows an essay on "La figure religieuse de Gandhi," for whom he has a great respect, though he finds "sa religion trop 'morale,' trop anglaise, trop protestante" (but there are Catholic elements in his "protection de la vache," "fidélité à la caste," etc.). Tagore is, he thinks, less profound than Gandhi.

Finally, he deals at great length with *La Defense de l'Occident*, by one Marris, who fears the malign influence of the "East" (which seems to include anything east of the Rhine) in deliberate disintegration of the civilization of Europe. While agreeing with him that the only safety is "le retour au Catholicisme, qui a fait l'Europe et qui peut seul la refaire," Professor Levaux is at pains to show that Germany, Russia, and India all have elements of native culture, even of Catholicism, and the real danger to Europe lies in her own native vices and the divisions she has brought on herself by the war.

M. D. R. WILLINK.



THE BAD ABBOT OF EVESHAM, AND OTHER MEDIEVAL STUDIES. By H. P. Palmer, M.A. Blackwell, Oxford. 4s. 6d.

Mr. Palmer has done well to collect into one volume these scattered essays which originally appeared in *The Churchman*, *The Nineteenth Century*, *The Modern Churchman*, and elsewhere, for they have a charm that is all their own, and are too good to be passed over. The author shows much quiet erudition and a clear and pleasant style; also, what is rarer, enough historical imagination to make him write as though he had been personally acquainted with overbearing abbots and scheming prelates, with starving monks and downtrodden citizens, and had himself witnessed some of the dramatic scenes which he describes. Were we not present, too, when Hugh de Eversdon, Abbot of St. Albans, setting out from Dover against the order of Edward II., to lay one of his personal quarrels before the Pope, was arrested on the seashore, with the boats already crowded to suffocation with luggage, retinue, and horses, and the carriers about to lift the abbot in their arms and carry him through the surf on board? Were we not there in Westminster Abbey when Elizabeth Woodville, the Queen of Edward IV., took sanctuary with six of her seven children, hoping to be safe from the protector, who afterwards became Richard III.? In vain! Sanctuary was violated; the eldest son torn from his mother's arms. "She called for her boy, gave him a last and hasty embrace, and, turning her back, burst into tears." Alas! those were cruel times.

Several of the essays should warm the heart of Dr. Coulton, for, though he is certainly acquainted with the sources from which Mr. Palmer draws his information, he will be delighted to read again of the wickedness of ecclesiastics and their yielding to the world, the flesh, and the devil. The "bad Abbot of Evesham" was very bad indeed. He built princely houses and entertained with regal magnificence, but he was so fond of drink that no one who visited him could be sure whether the abbot would be sober or drunk. Worse, the visitor might find himself in the midst of a troop of profligate women who enjoyed access to the abbot's private apartments. To extravagance and sensuality the abbot united cruelty and meanness. His monks were almost starving, and the state of their clothes was a public scandal.

Other abbots mentioned in the book seem to have been little better, and the revolt of the townsmen of St. Albans against their intolerable exactions makes sad reading. Those who sigh for a return of the spirit of the Middle Ages might do well to compare the condition of a monastery in the thirteenth century with Mirfield or Buckfast today.

The saddest chapter in the book is that dealing with the treatment of the Jews in England prior to 1290. Many of the facts are familiar from that excellent book, *The Legacy of Israel*, but they are put in a way that brings home to the Christian conscience the disgrace of England's unchristian attitude to the Jews in those early days. Fortunately, Jews are now in our midst as honoured citizens, and I know more than one Jew who prays daily for England because of her generosity to his race.

In conclusion, we thank Mr. Palmer for his vivid evocation of the past, and we hope that he will follow up this little volume by several others.

AELFRIDA TILLYARD.